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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
KEITH AND EVELYN COMBE, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
ATTORNEYS TITLE GUARANTEE 
FUND, INC., AND ROBERT E. 
FROERER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 880353-CA 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court 
Weber County, State of Utah 
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Judge Presiding 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BREUER AND HARRISON 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in a civil 
contract and tort action, in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Judge, 
presiding. The appeal was initially taken to the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-
2(3) (J) (1953 as amended). The appeal was then transferred 
to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
78-2-2(4) and 78-2A-3(2)(J) (1953 as amended). 
Jurisdictional questions regarding the finality of the 
1 
a credit for the fair market rental value of the property 
during the time the Breuer-Harrison had possession of the 
property? 
5. What was the measure and what was the fair market 
rental value of the property during the time the Plaintiffs 
Breuer-Harrison had possession of the property? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no determinative statutes, however, Breuer-
Harrison rely upon Section 57-1-12 of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
References to the record will be designated R, 
references to the trial transcript (R 1405) will be 
designated T. 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. Keith and Philip Combe obtained, by gift, a parcel 
of property located across the street from the family home. 
(T 196, 212.) Prior to the gift of the property, the Weber 
County Conservancy District by condemnation proceedings, 
obtained a 3 0 foot wide easement and placed a large aqueduct 
underground within the confines of the easement. At trial, 
Keith Combe admitted knowledge of the acqueduct, which was 
installed either while Keith resided with his parents or 
while he visited them on a weekly basis. (T 212-213.) 
2. Keith and Philip Combe agreed to convey fee simple 
unencumbered title of the property to Breuer-Harrison by 
4 
to be tried between Breuer-Harrison and Combes was the 
"equitable" issue of the refund due. During the course of 
trial, the trial court concluded: there was no real issue to 
be presented to the jury; the jury was advisory only; Breuer-
Harrison were entitled to a directed verdict; and Breuer-
Harrison were entitled to a refund of all payments made to 
Combes under the Real Estate Contract, together with 
interest; and Combes were entitled to a credit for the fair 
market rental value of the property during the time Breuer-
Harrison retained possession under the terms of the Real 
Estate Contract. 
A STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Defendants Keith Combe, and Philip 
Combe were unable to convey fee simple unencumbered title to 
the Plaintiffs Breuer-Harrison? 
2. Whether the Combes1 inability to convey fee simple 
unencumbered title to Breuer-Harrison constituted an 
anticipatory breach of the Real Estate Contract? 
3. Whether Breuer-Harrison was entitled to a 
rescission of the Real Estate Contract as a result of Combes1 
anticipatory breach? 
4. If Breuer-Harrison was entitled to a rescission of 
the Real Estate Contract, what was the refund to which 
Breuer-Harrison was entitled, and did it include a refund of 
all payments made to Keith and Philip Combe, together with 
interest thereon, and were Keith and Philip Combe entitled to 
3 
concession in the Contract for Keith Combe, a new title 
report was presented by Keith Combe which disclosed the 
existence of the easement. (See Deposition of William 
Harrison, R 191, pg. 30, lines 7-14; and Deposition of Bruce 
Nilson, R 1420, pg. 42.) 
INITIAL EFFORTS TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF EASEMENT 
7. Upon being notified of the existence of the 
easement Breuer-Harrison began an investigation to determine 
the impact of the easement upon the economics of the 
development of the property. (See Deposition of Casper 
Breuer, R 100, pg. 63, lines 8-13; pg. 64, lines 8-13, and 
page 65, lines 1-11.) 
BELIEF THAT FAILURE TO DISCLOSE WAS THE FAULT OF THE 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
8. Breuer-Harrison, without seeking advice of counsel, 
believed the failure to disclose the existence of the 
easement and the aqueduct was the result of negligence on the 
part of the Defendant attorney Froerer, who prepared the Real 
Estate Contract for Combe and who prepared the policy of 
title insurance provided by Combe for Breuer-Harrison. Based 
upon this belief, Breuer-Harrison contacted Froerer, and the 
title insurance company to determine what they intended to do 
to resolve the problem. (See Deposition of William Harrison, 
R 191, pgs. 30-31, lines 20-25, and pages 32-34; and 
Deposition of Bruce Nilson, R 1420, pg. 45.) Breuer-Harrison 
made no direct contact with Keith Combe until the summer of 
1984, but believed that Bruce or Duane had. (Deposition of 
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virtue of a Real Estate Contract dated January 9, 1980. (R. 
1409, exhibit 20) 
AN UNDISCLOSED EASEMENT ENCUMBERED THE PROPERTY 
3. When Breuer-Harrison purchased the property, Combes 
did not disclose the existence of the 30' wide easement which 
traversed the property diagonally in a Northwest direction 
and they did not disclose the existence of the aqueduct. 
Neither the Real Estate Contract (R 1409, exhibit 20), nor 
the policy of title insurance (R 1409 exhibit 26) made any 
reference to the easement. 
AMENDMENTS TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
4. Subsequent to the date of the Real Estate Contract, 
the parties entered into four amendments which extended the 
time of the payments due and/or provided for alternate 
methods of payment of the balance due on the contract. Two 
of the amendments were conditioned upon certain events 
occurring which did not occur and they did not therefore 
become effective. (R 1409, Exhibit 20) 
5. All but one amendment reaffirmed the underlying 
Real Estate Contract and its contractual provisions and 
contained the following or similar language: 
"Except for the above Amendment, all other terms 
and conditions of the Real Estate Contract dated 
December 29, 1979 shall remain the same and in full 
force and effect." 
EXISTENCE OF EASEMENT DISCLOSED 
6. More than three years after the Real Estate 
Contract was executed, while in the process of negotiating a 
5 
execution of the Real Estate Contract. (See Deposition of 
Harrison, R 191, pgs. 31-33, and page 42, lines 18-25.) 
During the settlement negotiations, Keith Combe indicated 
that he didn't want to reduce the purchase price of the 
property to reflect its diminished value with the easement in 
place. (T 219) 
KNOWLEDGE THAT KEITH COMBE MAY HAVE KNOWN OF THE 
EASEMENT 
12. Breuer-Harrison did not know before the summer of 
1984, that Keith Combe may have known of the existence of the 
easement prior to the time that he entered into the Real 
Estate Contract. (See Deposition of Harrison, R 191, pg. 11, 
lines 10-22.) This action was filed in September of 1984, 
approximately one month after the disclosure of Keith Combe 
that he may have known of the existence of the aqueduct. 
THE PLAT MAP GIVEN TO BREUER-HARRISON DID NOT 
DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT. 
13. Prior to the execution of the Real Estate Contract, 
Breuer-Harrison made a brief visit to the property 
(Deposition of Breuer, R 100, pgs. 11-13) and made a short 
visit to Great Basin Engineering to determine how many lots 
could be placed upon the parcel of property they were 
considering purchasing. 
14. During their short visit with Great Basin 
Engineering, the engineer drew a free hand sketch 
demonstrating the approximate number of lots which could be 
placed upon the property. The free hand sketch (which had 
8 
Breuer, R 100, pg. 55, lines 11-16.) 
KNOWLEDGE OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY EASEMENT 
9. As a result of information being received in 
several successive steps, Breuer-Harrison became aware just 
shortly before they filed this action that the easement and 
the aqueduct prevent them from developing the property in an 
economically feasible manner. Some of the final information 
was acquired after the filing of this action. (See 
Deposition of Harrison, R 191, pg. 37, lines 14-20; and Bruce 
Nilson R 1420, pg. 65.) 
10. It is quite clear, however, that the extent of the 
damage caused by the easement (the width of the right of way, 
the conditions surrounding the right of way, the actual depth 
of the aqueduct and the additional problems created thereby) 
was not known by Plaintiffs until much later than February 
26, 1984. (See Deposition of Breuer, R 100, pgs. 52-56; and 
Deposition of Harrison, R 191, pg. 37, lines 14-20). 
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 
11. Preliminary settlement discussions took place 
between the parties during the period following the discovery 
of the existence of the easement (early 1983) ; and after 
initial investigations revealed the potential for a 
significant impact upon the economics of the development of 
the property (late 1983 or early 1984) ; and up to and 
including the date the Plaintiffs discovered Keith Combe may 
have known of the existence of the Easement prior to the 
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18. Combes were unable to get Jay Anderson to testify 
that he told Breuer-Harrison of the existence of the pipeline 
or the easement prior to their purchase of the property. 
(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 25, lines 11-20). 
PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, 
GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE SURFACE CONDITIONS OF 
THE PROPERTY. 
19. Great Basin Engineering was engaged by Breuer-
Harrison to evaluate the surface physical characteristics of 
the property, to see whether the water table and topographic 
conditions might impede its development. (Deposition of 
Anderson, R 1415, pg. 29-30, lines 24-25 and 1-6.) 
20. Great Basin drew upon their prior knowledge of the 
storm water runoff; analyzed the soil types, (Deposition of 
Anderson, R 1415, pgs. 3 3-35); and reviewed the physical 
placement of Skyline Drive. (Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, 
pg. 37, lines 21-25 and pg. 38.) 
GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING WAS SHOWN THE TITLE REPORT 
DISCLOSING THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME 
IN 1983. 
21. Great Basin Engineering saw the title report 
disclosing the existence of the easement for the first time 
in 1983, more than three years after they examined the 
physical conditions of the surface of the real property. 
(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 51, lines 6-22). 
22. Upon obtaining a copy of the title report, Great 
Basin Engineering obtained a copy of the actual easement from 
Weber Basin, (Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 56, lines 
10 
been copied in blue and was given to Breuer-Harrison) did not 
disclose the easement. The pipeline, as it crossed the 
property to be purchased, was either not visible on the 
blueprint, or was so obscured that it was impossible to see. 
(Deposition of Jay Anderson, R 1415, pg. 79, lines 12-14). 
15. The Plat Maps created after the purchase of the 
property did not demonstrate the easement and did not clearly 
demonstrate the existence of the pipeline over the property. 
(Deposition of Jay Anderson, R 1415, pgs. 45, lines 18-25 and 
pg. 46, lines 1-7). 
16. The first Plat Map actually created by Great Basin 
Engineering came into existence several months after the 
purchase of the property. It virtually obscured the 
existence of the pipeline over the subdivision; was not given 
to Breuer-Harrison; but instead was presented to the engineer 
for the county and for the City of Ogden. (Deposition of Jay 
Anderson, R 1415, pg. 46, lines 8-12.) Jay Anderson doesn't 
even recall if a copy of the Plat Map was given to Steve 
Keil. (Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 47, lines 1-15.) 
COMBES FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN 
EASEMENT AND A PIPELINE. 
17. During pretrial discovery, Combes consistently 
failed to understand the difference between the term 
"pipeline" and the term "easement". (Deposition of Jay 
Anderson, R 1415, pg. 71, lines 16-20.) 
THERE IS NO RECORD THAT ESTABLISHES THAT JAY 
ANDERSON TOLD BREUER-HARRISON OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE 
PIPELINE, MUCH LESS THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT. 
9 
the developer and/or owner of the property making them 
responsible for repairs to the aqueduct, basically requiring 
them to become insurers. (Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, 
pg. 67, lines 17-25, pg. 68, lines 1-22.) 
26. The existence of the easement would require the 
developer to put in an additional sewer line running down the 
back of the lot lines of the project housing development. 
(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 102, lines 18-25.) 
27. The existence of the easement made fifteen feet of 
the property on either side of the aqueduct "essentially 
unusable for anything except vegetation." (Deposition of 
Anderson, R 1415, pg. 83, lines 6-12.) 
28. The easement required special bridging or a 
concrete cover to be placed over any portion of the aqueduct 
that "sits within a street." (Deposition of Anderson, R 
1415, pg. 83, lines 20-25; pg. 84, lines 1-3.) 
JAY ANDERSON COULD NOT RECALL ANY SPECIFIC 
CONVERSATIONS WITH STEVEN KEIL IN WHICH HE TALKED ABOUT THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE PIPELINE. 
29. Jay Anderson could not recall telling Steve Keil 
about of the existence of the pipeline (not the easement) in 
1979. Jay Anderson testified as follows. 
"Q. But I'm asking you now, can you recall 
any specific conversation with Steve Keil about the 
pipeline, other than your assumption that there had 
been conversation; can you recall any specific 
conversation? 
A. No, I canft." 
(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 94, lines 21-25.) 
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21-25 and pg. 57, line 1.); and obtained additional 
information concerning the easement and the problems it 
created. (Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 57, lines 9-
16.) 
23. Great Basin Engineering did not know of the 
existence of the 3 0 foot easement and its impact upon 
development of the property in the years 1979-80. Jay 
Anderson testified as follows: 
"Q. Now, if you would have known of the 
existence of this 30-foot easement and all of these 
conditions and restrictions in 1979, would you have 
shown that easement and those restrictions or 
indications on the plan as to that easement or 
whatever impact it may have had on development? 
A. We would have shown the width of the 
easement. And instead of running a road over the 
easement, we would have probably tried to run back 
lot lines on it to limit the amount of impact on 
it." (Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 84, line 
25; pg. 85, lines 1-8.) 
THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT CREATED AN ALMOST 
INSURMOUNTABLE BARRIER TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPERTY. 
24. Jay Anderson testified that the existence of the 
easement prohibited the placement of houses over the easement 
and created special problems if the developer wanted to cross 
the easement with utilities. (Deposition of Anderson, R 
1415, pg. 41, lines 1-9.) 
25. The existence of the easement and the pipeline, 
made the approval process of digging around the pipeline 
almost insurmountable, placed enormous restrictions on the 
backfill over the pipeline, placed restrictions on the 
laterals for utilities, and placed the financial burden on 
11 
disagreement with every statement in Combes1 Statement of 
Facts as contained in its brief since many of them are 
refuted by Breuer-Harrison's Statement of Facts, however, it 
is significant to note that several statements made by Combes 
are incorrect and misleading. 
1. Combe brief, pg 7, para. 5. Breuer-Harrison had 
not been involved in large scale residential projects. Note, 
William Harrison was a native of Salt Lake, not a large scale 
California developer. 
2. Combe brief, pg 9, para. 10. The so-called "base 
sheet" was never given to Breuer-Harrison. All the 
subdivision layouts did not show the pipeline and its 3 0 foot 
easement. The reduced copy attached to Combe's brief and 
designated as Exhibit "A" was not the sketch given to Breuer-
Harrison during their visit to Great Basin Engineering. The 
sketch given to Breuer-Harrison was marked as Exhibit 3 to 
the Deposition of Anderson (R 1422). 
3. Combe brief, pg. 17, para. 31. This entire 
statement is inacurrate and is not supported by the record 
cited. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. At the time the Summary Judgment was granted to 
Breuer-Harrison, there was no admissible evidence which would 
demonstrate that Breuer-Harrison had knowledge of the 
easement prior to the execution of the Real Estate Contract. 
2. Keith and Philip Combe could not convey 
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HAD GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING KNOWN OF THE WIDTH OF 
THE EASEMENT AND THE SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EASEMENT, 
THEY WOULD HAVE ADVISED THE PURCHASERS NOT TO PURCHASE THE 
PROPERTY. 
30. Jay Anderson testified as follows: 
"Q. Now, if you had known when you met with . 
. . Steve Keil in 1979 of a 3 0-foot easement and 
the restrictions that apply that you discovered 
later in '83 were being rigorously enforced, would 
you have given him any special warnings in relation 
to this particular easement over and above those 
which you think you would have standardly given him 
as a result of a pipeline? 
A. Oh, naturally would have given him, 
suggested it was a really difficult piece of 
property to develop with those kind of restrictions 
on it, that cost would be higher than normal to 
develop the lots because of it. 
Q. Anything else you can think of you would 
have told him? 
A. Look for another piece of ground, 
probably. . ." 
(Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 98, lines 19-25, pg. 99, 
lines 1-8.) 
THE FIRST TIME THE EASEMENT WAS DRAWN BY GREAT 
BASIN ENGINEERING ON ANY PLATS. WAS AFTER THE DISCLOSURE OF 
THE EASEMENT IN THE TITLE REPORT DELIVERED BY COMBE TO BRUCE 
NILSON IN 1983. 
31. The first time the easement was shown on the 
drawings prepared by Great Basin, was after Keith Combe 
disclosed the existence of the easement in the title report 
and the title report was delivered by Bruce Nilson to Great 
Basin in 1983. (Deposition of Anderson, R 1415, pg. 103, 
lines 19-25, pg. 104, lines 1-15.) 
DISAGREEMENT WITH COMBES STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Breuer-Harrison will not take the time to set forth its 
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6. Upon rescision of the Real Estate Contract, Breuer-
Harrison was entitled to a refund of all money paid to and/or 
on behalf of the Combes, together with interest thereon, less 
the fair market rental value of the property. 
7. The fair market rental value of the property was to 
be determined by competant evidence from experts who could 
form an opinion as to the market value of the property, but 
could not be based upon speculative theories as to the profit 
or fair rate of return expected from a profitable venture. 
Breuer-Harrison provided such testimony. Combes relied upon 
inadmissible opinions of speculative profits to be obtained 
from a financial venture, the profitability of which could 
not be established. 
8. Combes1 brief ignored the controlling and 
applicable case law as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court, 
and instead relied upon generic statements taken from 
divorce, foreclosure and other inapplicable cases which are 
easily distinguishable. 
9. Combes have appealed for equity to be done, yet 
they want to have their cake and eat it too. They would urge 
that they should be entitled to take the property back, which 
they have done, and also keep all the payments made by 
Breuer-Harrison. 
10. Combes assertion that the bifurcation of the trial 
was prejudicial to Combes is not well taken. In fact, if the 
bifurcation had not taken place, it would have been extremely 
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unencumbered, fee title to the property to Breuer-Harrison as 
required by the Real Estate Contract and were therefore 
guilty of an anticipatory breach of the contract. 
3. When Breuer-Harrison discovered that the vendors 
Combes could not deliver unencumbered fee simple title and 
that an undisclosed easement severly impacted upon the 
property, they had the right to determine if, and when they 
would make an election to rescind the contract. Until they 
made such an election, there could be no waiver of their 
right to rescind. 
4. When the vendees Breuer-Harrison elected to claim 
an anticipatory breach, they were entitled to a summary 
judgment rescinding the contract for the reason that Combes 
could not convey unencumbered fee simple title as required by 
the contract. 
5. Breuer-Harrison did not know of the easement when 
they executed the Real Estate Contract, but even if they had, 
under Utah Law they had the right to expect fee simple 
unencumbered title as required by the Real Estate Contract. 
There is a difference between executory and executed 
contracts, and a vendor does not have to be able to convey 
fee title when the real estate contract is executed, only 
when the vendor's performance is required. Therefore 
knowledge of a deficiency of title by a vendee prior to the 
required performance of the vendor does not bar the right of 
the vendee to require such performance when due. 
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POINT NO. 2 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF AN 
ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF THE REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT AND PLAINTIFFS WERE RELIEVED OF 
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FURTHER PERFORMANCE 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT. 
An anticipatory breach of contract is committed when a 
party to a contract either cannot or will not perform at the 
time such performance is required by the contract. 17 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Contracts §448. 
When there has been an anticipatory breach of a 
contract, the other party may treat the entire contract as 
though it had been breached. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts §448. 
It is not necessary for the party not in breach to make a 
tender of performance. The party not in breach may either 
treat the contract as binding and wait for the time of actual 
breach, or may rescind the contract and sue for money paid. 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts §449. 
In University Club v. Invesco Holding Corporation, 29 
Utah 2d 1, 504, P.2d 29 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
" . . . The recognized rule is that where one party 
definitely indicates that he cannot or will not 
perform a condition of a contract, the other is not 
required to uselessly abide time, but may act upon 
the breached condition. Indeed in appropriate 
circumstances he ought to do so to mitigate 
damages." 
(Id. at 30.) 
The doctrine of Anticipatory Breach is applicable in the 
case at hand. The Defendants Combes were unable to perform 
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prejudicial to Breuer-Harrison. Combes had no standing to 
participate in the issues which were bifurcated and reserved 
for later determination• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
COMBES PRESENTED NO COMPETENT ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING OF 
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
DEMONSTRATE THAT BREUER-HARRISON KNEW OF 
THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT PRIOR TO 
THE EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT. 
Although Combes made every attempt to obtain admissible 
evidence to establish that Breuer-Harrison knew of the 
existence of the easement prior to the execution of the Real 
Estate Contract in December of 1979, they were unsuccessful. 
The testimony of Jay Anderson of Great Basin made it clear 
that had he known of the existence of the easement and its 
complications in 1979, he would have advised Breuer-Harrison 
to find another piece of property. To the contrary, Combes 
knew or should have known of the existence of the easement, 
but did not disclose its existence. 
At the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment, it was 
clear that no plat map created by Great Basin prior to the 
year 1983 disclosed the existence of the easement. 
Furthermore, it was clear that the pipeline was not visible 
on the free hand sketch (blueprint) plat map given to Breuer-
Harrison prior to the execution of the Real Estate Contract. 
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for damages; (3) to sue at once for damages. 17A C.J.S. 
Contracts §472. 
The inability of the breaching party to perform the 
contract constitutes grounds for rescission of the contract 
if the performance anticipated is essentially different from 
the performance promised. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts §506. 
In Marlowe Investment Corporation v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 
124, 485 P.2d 1402 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
" . . . Nevertheless, if it plainly appears that he 
[the vendor] has so lost or encumbered his 
ownership or his title that he will not be able to 
fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that the 
purchaser continue to make payments when it is 
obvious that his own performance will not be 
forthcoming. . ." 
(Id. at 1404.) 
In Hurwitz v. David K. Richards & Company, 20 Utah 2d 
232, 436 P.2d 794 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
the common law rule that if there is an anticipatory breach, 
the non-breaching party has three options available: one, to 
treat the entire contract as breached and sue for damages; 
two, to treat the contract as binding and wait until the time 
for performance and then bring action on the contract; and 
three, to rescind the contract and sue for money paid. The 
Utah Supreme Court quoted from 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §4 51 
which indicates that the anticipatory breach is kept open 
until the injured party elects to treat the contract as 
breached and brings action. 
In the case at hand, Breuer-Harrison was excused from 
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their obligations under the contract to convey fee simple, 
unencumbered title to Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs were 
entitled to maintain this action and were entitled to a 
determination that the Defendants were guilty of an 
anticipatory breach of the Contract. 
POINT NO. 3 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD THE OPTION OF 
DETERMINING WHEN THEY WOULD MAKE THE 
ELECTION OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. UNTIL THE PLAINTIFFS MADE THE 
ELECTION, THERE COULD BE NO WAIVER BY THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
When the injured party discovers the anticipatory 
breach, the injured party has the right to make an election 
as to whether he will treat the contract as breached before 
the time performance is due or to wait until actual 
performance is due under the contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Contracts §449. 
There is no breach until the anticipatory breach is 
recognized by the injured party, and there is no particular 
time during which the injured party must make his election to 
take advantage of the breach. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts 
§456. 
Where there is an anticipatory breach of the contract, 
the injured party is excused from performance. 17 Am. Jur. 
2d, Contracts §428. 
When there is an anticipatory breach, the injured party 
has the right to pursue three remedies, i.e. (1) to rescind 
the contracts; (2) to treat the contract as binding and sue 
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CJS Vendor & Purchaser §161(3). 
The mere fact that Combes and First Security Bank as 
trustee for Philip Combe could not convey a fee simple, 
unencumbered title did not excuse them from their obligation 
to perform. 92 CJS Vendor & Purchaser §229, and §229(c)(3). 
Their inability to perform did not prevent Breuer-Harrison 
from obtaining a rescission of the contract. 92 CJS Vendor & 
Purchaser §165. 
The deed to which Breuer-Harrison was entitled was one 
which conveyed the fee title to the land without the 
easement. 92 CJS Vendor & Purchaser §203. Combes' argument 
that Paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract concerning the 
physical condition of the land excuses Combes from complying 
with the express provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Real Estate 
Contract concerning title is not well taken. 
An encumbrance is any adverse right or privilege which 
interferes with the full right and use of the land. 92 CJS 
Vendor & Purchaser §235 (a) . An easement is an encumbrance 
and constitutes a defect in the title. See Marlow Investment 
Corporation v. Radmall. 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d 1402 (1971); 
and Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 P. 2d 
276 (1943). 
In Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 
P.2d 276 (Utah 1943), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
11
. . . The vendee is entitled to the very 
consideration for which he bargained and gave 
value—good title to the land, where the agreement 
is to convey title by warranty deed without 
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further payments when it was determined that Combes could not 
deliver the title they contracted to convey, at a future 
specified date. It is to their credit that Breuer-Harrison 
made reasonable efforts to mitigate the potential loss and 
attempted to see if they could overcome the easement by 
creative engineering. Breuer-Harrison expended thousands of 
reimbursed dollars for engineering evaluations and drawings 
in an effort to mitigate the loss. When Breuer-Harrison 
determined that the additional engineering costs to overcome 
the effects of the easement would exceed $150,000.00 they 
concluded that they could not develop the property 
economically. 
Since there can be no waiver of a right of action until 
it arises, and since no right of action arose until 
Plaintiffs elected to treat the anticipatory breach as a 
breach of the contract and coinmenced legal action, there 
could be no waiver of that breach until after the election 
was made by Plaintiffs. 
POINT NO. 4 
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF RESCISSION OF THE REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT. 
A purchaser of property is not bound to accept a 
defective title. 92 CJS Vendor & Purchaser §221. If the 
vendors (Combes and First Security Bank) could not convey a 
title free and clear of encumbrances, the purchasers (Breuer-
Harrison) were entitled to a rescission of the contract. 91 
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contract was amended twice by the parties. The vendee went 
into possession at the time of the contract and remained in 
possession. The vendee went into default and failed to make 
the payments due. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
". . . Under a land contract calling for deferred 
payments and delivery of the deed at the time of 
the final payment, marketable title in vendor at 
the time he is required to deliver the deed is 
sufficient, the provisions in the contract 
expressly calling for earlier perfecting of title 
having been waived. . ." 
(Id. at 143.) 
In Castaano v. Church, 552 P. 2d 1282 (Utah 1976), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that where the vendor could not 
provide the water rights contemplated under the real estate 
contract, the rule applicable is as follows: 
11
. . . The rule has been long established that a 
vendee has the right to insist upon performance by 
the vendor to the extent the latter is able to 
perform with an abatement in the purchase price 
equal to the value of the deficiency or defect.11 
(Id. at 1284.) 
Under Utah Law, if Breuer and Harrison had demanded 
specific performance of the contract, they would have been 
entitled to a deduction in the purchase price in an amount 
equal to the reduced market value of the property as a result 
of the easement. 
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qualifications•" 
fid, at 2810 
It is clear under the common law and the Utah law as 
expressed by the Utah Supreme Court that Plaintiffs were not 
required to accept less than fee simple, unencumbered title 
from Combes. No matter how you view the situation, the 
Combes were guilty of an anticipatory breach of the contract 
and could not convey fee simple, unencumbered title. The 
breach of the contract goes to the essence of the contract in 
that the value of the property was so substantially damaged 
by the existence of the easement, that Breuer-Harrison could 
not receive the property which they contracted to receive. 
Where the essence of the bargain was so substantially 
destroyed, the Plaintiffs were entitled to a rescission of 
the contract. 
Had Breuer-Harrison elected to enforce the Real Estate 
Contract and sue for damages, their damages would have been 
the difference between the contract price and the fair market 
value of the property with the easement. 
In Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66 (Utah 1982), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
". . . If this were a real estate contract, the 
usual measure of damage would be the appellant's 
benefit of the bargain with reference to the 
contract price and the market value of the property 
at the time of the breach. . ." 
(Id. at 71). 
In Navlor v. Jolley, 100 Utah 130, 111 P.2d 142 (1941), 
the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a real estate 
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be determined at trial. 
B. KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENT IS NOT A 
DEFENSE IN A CLAIM FOR ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT TO 
CONVEY FEE SIMPLE UNENCUMBERED TITLE. 
If you assume, for purpose of argument, that Breuer-
Harrison knew of the existence of the easement or had such 
knowledge as to put them on a duty of inquiry as to the 
easement, they made such, by requiring a title search and a 
policy of title insurance which the Defendants provided, and 
in which it was represented and warranted that there were no 
easements on the property. Pursuant to the representations 
and warranties contained in the Real Estate Contract, and the 
representations and warranties contained in the policy of 
title insurance, Breuer-Harrison purchased the property and 
continued to make payments thereon. 
Waiver is not a defense to the claim of a vendee to 
require the vendor to comply with the terms of the real 
estate contract and convey fee simple, unencumbered title to 
the property. See Marlowe Investment Corporation v. Radmall. 
26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d 1402 (1971); Hurwitz v. David K. 
Richards & Company, 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P.2d 794 (1968); 
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 P. 2d 276 
(1943); Navlor v. Jollev, 100 Utah 130, 111 P.2d 142 (1941); 
Castaano v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1976); Leonard v. 
Woodruff, 23 Utah 494, 65 Pac. 199 (1901); Glassman v. 
Condon, 27 Utah 473, 76 Pac. 343 (1904); and Hall v. 
Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983) 
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POINT NO. 5 
PLAINTIFFS1 DID NOT KNOW OF THE EASEMENT 
AT THE TIME OF THE PURCHASE OF THE 
PROPERTY, BUT EVEN IF THEY HAD, SUCH 
KNOWLEDGE WOULD NOT HAVE BARRED THIS 
ACTION. 
A,. EXECUTORY CONTRACTS V. EXECUTED CONTRACTS. 
An executory real estate contract is an agreement which 
is not fully performed by the parties to the agreement and in 
which title has not been conveyed to the buyers. To the 
contrary, a fully performed real estate contract is an 
agreement in which the parties have performed their 
obligations under the contract, have conveyed title, and have 
either no further obligations, or have issued negotiable 
instruments which create new causes of action. 
The doctrine of anticipatory breach is applicable only 
in the case of executory contracts in which title has not 
been conveyed and would not apply to those contracts which 
have been fully performed and in which title has been 
conveyed. By the same token, the doctrine of waiver of the 
breach is not applicable in claims of anticipatory breach 
because until the damaged party elects to treat the 
anticipatory breach as a breach, there can be no waiver. 
On the other hand, where the contract has been fully 
performed, and title has been conveyed, the failure of the 
injured party to act in a timely manner, after full 
performance, and after discovery of fraud may constitute a 
waiver and the issue of waiver is usually an issue of fact to 
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outstanding encumbrances, and that he agreed to 
take only the title which the vendor then had, 
where such facts depends upon extrinsic evidence, 
and are contradictory of the express terms of the 
contract entered into between the parties.1111 
fid, at 140.) 
In Leonard v. Woodruff, 23 Utah 494, 65 Pac. 199 (1901), 
the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the general rule of law as 
follows: 
"Generally, the vendor, in the absence of an 
agreement. . . is required, as a condition 
precedent to the bringing or maintaining an action 
for specific performance to tender to the vendee a 
conveyance of a good marketable title to the whole 
property contracted for . . . " 
fid, at 203.) 
In Leonard, the contract for the exchange of real 
property did not provide an express warranty of marketable 
title. The Utah Supreme Court held that no implied warranty 
of marketable title would be imposed upon the vendor where 
squatters occupied a small corner of the property, and the 
vendee had express knowledge of the squatters on the 
property, and a deed was prepared and the vendee did not 
object to the form of the deed when it was presented to the 
vendee. 
The Leonard case was later cited by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Glassman v. Condon, 27 Utah 463, 76 Pac. 343 (1904). 
In Glassman, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that the 
Leonard case was to be narrowly construed and was applicable 
only where it was determined by the trial court, as a matter 
of fact, that the parties had agreed that the vendor would be 
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In Glassman v. Condon, 27 Utah 473, 76 Pac. 343 (1904), 
the Utah Supreme Court specifically rejected an argument that 
the buyer's prior knowledge of an outstanding mortgage barred 
buyer from requiring a fee simple title to be conveyed upon 
payment of the contract price. In specific, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
" . . . The respondent contracted to furnish a 
good title, and the fact that he was unable to do 
so is his misfortune, and not the fault of the 
appellant." 
(Id. at 345.) 
Not only did Glassman require conveyance of fee simple 
title free and clear of the encumbrance, it also stated that 
the effect of a warranty deed is to require fee simple title 
with covenants from the grantor. This decision is in accord 
with the Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-12 which specifically 
requires a warranty deed to have the effect of a conveyance 
in fee simple, with warranties, free and clear of 
encumbrances. 
In Simpson v. Stallincrs. 225 P.2d 139 (N.M. 1950), the 
New Mexico Supreme Court quoting from 57 A.L.R. 1253, at 
1541, set forth the following common law rule regarding 
knowledge of defects at the time of the purchase of real 
property: 
»»* * * [T]he general rule is that knowledge by the 
vendee of the vendor's lack of title at the time he 
entered into the contract is immaterial, since he 
has a right to rely upon the vendor either having a 
title, or procuring it so as to carry out his 
agreement. It is no defense for the vendor to show 
that the vendee knew of the existence of 
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disallowance of interest. . . " 
(Id, at 1150) 
This general statement of the common law is the rule of 
law adopted by the Utah Supreme Court and reiterated on 
several occasions. 
In Hurwitz v. David K. Richards & Company, 20 Utah 2d 
232, 436 P.2d 797 (1968), The Utah Supreme Court restated the 
general rule concerning rescission arising out of the 
anticipatory breach of a contract to sell real estate. The 
court stated: 
"If there had been an anticipatory breach, 
Richards had three options available to him: 
1. Treat the entire contract as broken 
and sue for damages. 
2. Treat the contract as still binding and 
wait until the time arrived for its performance and 
at such time bring an action on the contract. 
3. Rescind the contract and sue for money 
paid or for the value of the services of property 
furnished." 
(Id, at 796.) 
In Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed a case involving the rescission of a 
contract for the sale of a mobile home. The Jury awarded the 
purchaser the return of his down payment. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
"The return to buyers of their down payment 
after justifiable rescission is consistent with 
long precedent." 
(Id. at 308.) 
In Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954), 
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permitted to convey less than a fee simple, unencumbered 
title. 
In Glassman. the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
1 1
. . . It is an elementary principle of law that 
every purchaser of real property has a right to 
demand a title free from incumbrance and defects. 
And the great weight of authority holds that the 
legal affect of contracts to furnish a good title 
or a warranty deed, under a contract of purchase, 
is that the vendor, before he can compel payment of 
the purchase price, or any part thereof, must make 
and tender a title free from incumbrance and 
unclouded. . . unless the contract by its terms, or 
the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the 
transaction, show the parties intended that the 
sale and transfer of the property should be made 
subject to the defects, if any, in the title. . ." 
(Id. at 344.) 
The Glassman case is recognized as precedent and is 
cited in Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983) in 
which reference is made to the foregoing quotation. 
POINT NO. 6 
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A REFUND 
FROM THE DEFENDANTS COMBES IN AN AMOUNT 
EQUAL TO THE PAYMENTS MADE TO OR ON 
BEHALF OF THE COMBES, LESS THE FAIR 
MARKET RENTAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY 
DURING THE APPLICABLE PERIOD. 
In 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser Section 178, the general 
rule of law regarding a purchaser's right to a refund of 
money paid on a rescinded contract is as follows: 
"On rescission by the purchaser for causes 
authorizing a rescission, he is entitled to be 
restored to the position he was in at the time of 
the execution of the contract. Accordingly, he is 
entitled to a restoration of the purchase money and 
to interest thereon from the time of payment, even 
in the absence of prayer for restoration, unless 
there is some equity in the case which requires a 
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the claim of rescission did not arise, except as an after 
thought, and the court concluded that the purchaser had 
really abandoned the contract. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
". . . The effect of her conduct appears to 
have been to treat the contract as abandoned. It 
should be so regarded and she should not be 
permitted to "resurrect" and assert such a claim in 
this suit." 
fid, at 194.) 
Other courts have followed the same rule of law adopted 
by the Utah Supreme Court. In the following cases from other 
jurisdictions, certain issues not treated in the Utah Supreme 
Court opinions are resolved in favor of the Plaintiffs. 
In Matanuska Valley Bank v. Abernathy, 445 P.2d 235 
(Alaska 1968), the Alaska Supreme Court found that because of 
an easement not disclosed, the vendee was entitled to 
rescission of the contract and that the purchaser was 
entitled to a refund and payment of the following: 
"Since recision (sic) was ordered because of 
the inability of the Bank to convey a beneficial 
title to a substantial portion of the property, 
Abernathy was entitled to a return of all of the 
money paid on the purchase price, including 
interest and of any amount expended in payment of 
taxes, plus interest on said sums. In addition, 
Abernathy was entitled to reimbursement for monies 
expended for permanent improvements made to the 
property and for monies expended to provide fire 
insurance coverage on the buildings. The Bank is 
entitled to the fair rental value of the property 
for such period of time as is appropriately 
chargeable against Abernathy." 
(Id. at 239.) 
In addition see Miller v. Sears, 636 P. 2d 1183 (Alaska 
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the Utah Supreme Court restated the general rule concerning 
rescission of a real estate contract. The Utah Supreme Court 
said: 
" . . . Where a contract for the sale of land 
is rescinded by mutual agreement with no express 
agreement as to the damages to the seller or the 
return of the purchase money paid, the purchaser is 
entitled to recover the money paid on the purchase 
price less the reasonable rental value of the 
property which he has occupied. Here we have 
either a mutual rescission of the contract of 
purchase, or plaintiffs terminated defendants1 
rights under the contract on account of their 
failure to live up to one or all of these 
agreements. Under either of those situations 
defendants are entitled to an accounting for this 
sum of money, for . . . there was no express 
agreement in either of the leases to the effect 
that defendants should not recover this money paid 
under the contract of sale. . . . " 
(Id. at 299.) 
In Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 357 P.2d 190 
(1960), the Utah Supreme Court restated the general rule 
regarding rescission of real estate contracts as follows: 
11
. . . Under usual circumstances we would 
agree with the trial court's view that the parties 
should be restored to status quo by charging Mrs. 
Blohm with the reasonable rental value of the 
property during her occupancy, crediting her with 
payments she had made, and giving her judgment for 
the difference on her counterclaim. But a court 
should not so decree where it appears unfair and 
inequitable to do so." 
fid, at 193.) 
It should be noted that the unfair and inequitable 
reason why the refund should not have been made in Leavitt 
was that the original payment was a trade of property, which 
was apparently not worth the recited $5,000 and furthermore, 
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Heiskanen had been an appraiser in the Ogden area for 14 
years, was an SRA, an SRPA, a candidate member in the 
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, had been past 
president, secretary and State director of the American 
Society of American Appraisers. He taught the upper division 
appraising course at Weber State College and had performed 
over 5,500 appraisals in the Ogden area. (T., pgs. 32-34.) 
Mr. Heiskanen testified that there are three approaches 
in determining the fair market value of property: 1. the 
direct sales or market approach; 2. the cost approach, which 
cannot be applied to land, only to buildings; and 3. the 
income approach, which cannot be readily applied to rental of 
undeveloped land. (T., pgs. 3 6-37.) 
Mr. Heiskanen testified that the direct sales or market 
approach was the only appropriate method which could be used 
in the case at hand. (T., pg. 37.) Mr. Heiskanen testified 
that, in his opinion, the 19.6 acres of ground, rounded to 2 0 
acres would rent for $1,200 a year for 20 years. (T. , pgs. 
38, 40.) The property had previously been rented for $1,000 
a year, or $50.00 an acre. (T., pg. 39.) He further 
testified that the fair market value of the land would have 
little or nothing to do with the fair market rental. (T., 
pg. 39.) 
Combes called William L. Christensen, a Salt Lake 
appraiser to testify in their behalf. Mr. Christensen!s 
testimony was highly speculative, lacked credible foundation 
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1981) a case involving a rescission of a sale of real 
property, in which the Court granted rescission and refused 
to charge the buyers with the reasonable rental value of the 
property. The court awarded prejudgment interest to the 
buyers on the amounts credited to the buyers. 
In Walter v. Moore, 700 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1985), a case 
involving a rescission of a contract for sale of real 
property, rescission was granted and the buyer was awarded a 
refund of the payments made to the seller, payments made to 
repair the well and the pump shed, Attorneys fees and 
payments made on the trailer. 
In the case at hand, Breuer-Harrison, as vendees, were 
entitled to a refund of all payments to Combes and all taxes 
paid on the property, together with interest thereon. 
POINT NO. 7 
THE FAIR MARKET RENTAL VALUE OF THE REAL 
PROPERTY HAD TO BE ESTABLISHED BY 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
During the trial, counsel for Combes and Breuer-Harrison 
stipulated as to the amounts paid by Breuer-Harrison to 
Combes and in their behalf. The trial court merely accepted 
and adopted the stipulation, leaving only one remaining issue 
to be tried, namely, the fair market rental value of the 
property. 
During the trial Breuer-Harrison called two substantial 
independent appraisers to testify as to the fair market 
rental value of the property. The first appraiser, Allen 
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number of lots affected would be limited to two or three 
lots; (T., pg. 286.) and admitted that he permitted 
portions of his file to be removed before he appeared to 
testify. (T., pg. 287.) 
4. He admitted that in making his assumption that only 
two or three lots would be affected by the easement that he 
believed that a road could be placed over the easement, 
without any special bridging requirements. (T., pgs. 289, 
300.) He further admitted that if special concrete bridging 
requirements were imposed by the easement that it would have 
a serious impact upon the property. (T., pg. 304.) 
5. He further admitted that he made no determination 
of the cost of developing the subdivision (T. , pg. 290-291) 
and obtained no engineering estimates as to the cost of 
developing the subdivision (T., pg. 291) and therefore could 
not testify as to the economic feasibility of the 
development of the subdivision. (T., pgs. 304-307) 
8. He did not prepare a written appraisal because 
Combe's attorney asked him not to. (T., pg. 292.) 
9. He testified that he assumed the lots could be 
developed and sold at a rate of three to five a year at 
$22,000 per lot, (T., pgs. 292-293.) but he made no 
calculation of the present worth of the sale of three to five 
lots per year at $22,000 a lot, over a period of some 11 
years. (T., pgs. 294-296.) 
10. He further admitted that if the costs of 
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and failed to address the issue of fair market rental as 
follows: 
1. Mr. Christensen declined to testify as to the fair 
market rental value of the land in its present state, but 
instead rendered an opinion that an investment ought to 
return nine and a half to 11 percent or 12 percent. (T., pg. 
275-276.) After refusing to testify as to the fair market 
value of the property he then multiplied the so-called fair 
market value of the property times the reasonable rate of 
return that a person ought to expect from an investment and 
concluded that the property should bring a reasonable rate of 
return of $49,350 per year for six and a quarter years, or in 
other words $308,438. (T., pg. 278.) 
2. On cross examination, Mr. Christensen admitted: 
that he would have to consider the fair rental rate to be 
less than $49,350 per year; (R 1405, pg. 279.) admitted 
that he didnft know how many acres the property included; 
(R1405, pg. 280.) admitted that he didn't know what the cost 
would be to develop the land; and admitted he did not know 
what the effect of the easement would be because he did not 
consult with any engineers concerning the property. (T., pg. 
284.) 
3. He testified that he assumed, without any 
engineering input, that the easement would only impact upon 
two or three of the lots; (T., pg. 285.) and admitted that 
he didn't bring any materials with him to verify that the 
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economically feasible to develop the property for 
residential purposes, but had not made an analysis to 
determine if the assumption was correct. (T. , pgs. 309-
310) 
After he had testified that he had failed to make the 
necessary inquiry as to the economic feasibility of the 
development of the property for residential purposes, and 
that he had assumed it was economically feasible, the trial 
court asked Mr. Christensen to define fair market value. Mr. 
Christensen then admitted that fair market value would be the 
probable sale price which would occur 
"when two people negotiate neither being under 
pressure to buy or sell, both being typically 
informed as to the potential uses, each presumably 
acting in accordance with their best interests. In 
other words, prudent, and that there is no 
excessive time requirement on a purchase or a sale, 
so it's an arms length." 
(T., pg. 314). He further admitted that if you donft have a 
buyer then the formula he had utilized in giving his earlier 
testimony wouldn't work, and he admitted that the value would 
decline until it reached the market level. (T., pg. 314-
315.) 
After the conclusion of Mr. Christensen's testimony, 
counsel for Breuer-Harrison moved to strike his testimony on 
the grounds that it was speculative in that it was based upon 
the unproved assumption that the property could be developed 
economically for residential purposes. (T. , pg. 325-
326.) 
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development of the property became too high, the value of the 
land would be reduced. (T., pg. 306.) 
12. Although Mr. Christensen testified that the 
ultimate highest and best use of the real property would be 
as a residential subdivision development, (T., pg. 268.) he 
admitted that if the cost of the property together with the 
cost of development precluded its development for 
residential purposes that some other type of development 
would have to be considered as the highest and best use. 
(T., pg. 307.) 
13. He further admitted that he had not considered the 
possibility that the cost of the property together with the 
costs of development would make it economically unfeasible to 
develop the property either as residential property or as a 
planned unit development. (T., pg. 306-308.) He further 
admitted that if it was not economically feasible to develop 
the property, given its cost and the cost of development that 
it would have to be considered for school use, church use, 
crop land, grazing land or waste land. (T., pgs. 307-308). 
14. He further admitted that in determining the highest 
and best use that he would have to consider the physical 
conditions of the property, the legal ramifications, the 
economical feasibility and best use or ideal use, (T., pg. 
3 08) but that he had not considered the economic feasibility 
of the development of the property. (R 1405, pgs. 307-308). 
He further admitted that he had assumed that it was 
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an economically feasible manner, you would most likely lose 
money, and not make a profit. (T., pgs. 370-371.) He 
testified that return on investment does not equate to fair 
market rental value on raw ground. (T., pg. 375.) 
After hearing the testimony of the appraisers, the trial 
court determined that Mr. Christensen's testimony was highly 
speculative, and did not establish the fair market rental 
value of the land. The court recognized no other competent 
evidence was introduced by Combes as to the fair market 
rental value of the real estate. Since the appraisers called 
by Breuer-Harrison established the fair market rental value, 
the trial court adopted the highest fair market rental value 
established by the Breuer-Harrison appraisers as the fair 
market rental value and determined there was no issue to go 
to the jury and the court would grant a directed verdict at 
the highest amount which the Breuer-Harrison witnesses 
testified was the fair market rental value. (T., pg. 425.) 
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Mr. Heiskanen was recalled by Breuer-Harrison, who 
testified that fair return on investment and fair market 
rental value were not the same terms, because fair return on 
investment pre-supposed a profit. (T. , pg. 349.) He 
further testified that the market value of the land had no 
relationship to its fair market rental value. (T. , pg. 
351.) He further testified that if no one in the Ogden area 
were willing to pay $40,000 a year to rent the land that it 
would not have a fair market rental value of $40,000 a year, 
and he knew of no one who would pay such a price to rent the 
land. (T., pgs. 348-353.) 
As a rebuttal witness, Breuer-Harrison called Mr. John 
W. Hansen, an Ogden real estate broker to testify regarding 
the fair market rental value of the property. Mr. Hansen was 
a member of the Ogden Board, and out of 900 real estate 
agents, was one of approximately 22 who belonged to the 
Million Dollar Club. Mr. Hansen did the appraising for the 
Federal Land Bank and the PCA Northern Utah and had been 
involved in leasing transactions in the Ogden area. He 
testified that without expending money to improve the real 
property, in its condition as it existed at trial, its 
highest and best use was for agricultural purposes. (T. , 
pgs. 361-366.) He further testified that it was ridiculous 
to conclude that the subject property would ever bring a 
rental value of $40,000 a year. (T. , pg. 368.) He further 
testified that if you do not develop property quickly and in 
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The main issue presented to the trial court was the 
anticipatory breach of an executory contract for the sale of 
real property. There were several Utah cases presented to 
the trial court by counsel for Breuer-Harrison which were 
directly on point and constituted controlling law. The trial 
court relied upon those cases. 
CLAIMS OF WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES 
Keith Combe's memorandum fails to recognize that the 
case at hand deals with an executory real estate contract and 
claims of anticipatory breach. The defense of knowledge and 
waiver were not available to Keith Combe as a defense to the 
contract claim of Breuer-Harrison that they were entitled to 
fee simple unencumbered title. The following cases upon 
which Keith Combe places reliance, do not support his 
position. 
1. Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) holds 
against the position asserted by Keith Combe. In Dugan, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a vendee who discovered 
misrepresentations, but nevertheless continued to the date of 
trial making regular monthly payments and refusing to amend 
the pleadings to pray for rescission, did not waive any claim 
for damages. The Utah Supreme Court stated that a defrauded 
vendee has the option to elect to rescind or to affirm the 
contract and recover damages. 
2. Zuniga v. Leone, 77 Utah 494, 297 Pac. 1010 (1931), 
and Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P2d 699 (1934) are two 
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POINT NO. 8 
KEITH COMBE'S BRIEF ON APPEAL IGNORES 
CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW, RELIES UPON 
CASE LAW WHICH IS NEITHER IN POINT NOR 
SUPPORTIVE OF THE POSITION ASSERTED IN 
THE BRIEF. 
Although there is substantial controlling Utah case law 
directly on point, Combes have chosen to ignore that body of 
case law, and have instead chosen to rely upon generic 
judicial statements taken from divorce cases, uniform real 
estate foreclosure cases and other inapplicable cases. A 
review of the cases cited by Combes would take more space 
that Breuer-Harrison has available in this brief, however, a 
quick overview of Combes1 authority demonstrates that it is 
not controlling, is not on point and is in some instances, 
misleading. 
Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P. 2d 559 (Utah 1985); Johnson 
v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977); Soffe v. Ridd. 659 P.2d 
1082 (Utah 1983); and Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 
P.2d 446 (1952) are all uniform real estate contract 
foreclosure cases and deal with the issues of the right of a 
vendor to regain possession of the property and to retain all 
the payments made by the buyer. They are all clearly 
distinguishable from an equitable rescission. 
When Combes1 claims are analyzed, it is clear that 
Combes want to have the property returned to them and to keep 
all the payments made by the vendees, clearly an 
unconscionable, not an equitable result. 
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made, although it may be express or implied." 
(Id. at 3.) 
5. B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food Service, 82 
Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 37 (Utah App. 1988) was a claim for 
commissions on a sales representatives agreement and has no 
application to the case at hand. 
6. Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1988) was 
a case involving an action by a landlord to enforce a 
modified lease against the tenant and it held that the 
landlord had not waived its right to seek arrearages of rent 
and taxes. 
7. Perry v. Woodall, 20 Utah 2d 399, 438 P.2d 813 
(1968) holds that a buyer of a business who continues in 
possession of the business and its assets after discovery of 
"all of the facts" demonstrating that "he had been defrauded" 
cannot continue to operate the business, make payments 
thereon, permit the business to go into receivership, 
purchase the assets from the receiver, permit all the assets 
to be wasted and then sue for rescission, especially when the 
buyer has no assets to return to the seller in the event 
rescission is granted. 
8. Frailey v. McGarrv, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840 
(1949) involved a vendor who misrepresented the availability 
of water to the buyer. Rather than electing to rescind the 
contract upon discovery of the misrepresentation, the buyer 
attempted to keep the contract in full effect, obtain the 
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water rights sought from the State of Utah as to the lands to 
be conveyed under the contract, transfer those water rights 
to other lands and then act to rescind the contract. The 
trial court granted the buyer's request to rescind the 
contract conditioned upon the buyer conveying the water 
rights acquired back to the vendor. When the buyer refused 
to convey the water rights back to the vendor, the trial 
court held the contract was not subject to rescission. The 
Supreme Court held that the buyer could not act upon the 
contract as though it was valid to obtain certain water 
rights and then after obtaining those rights, request 
rescission, refuse to reconvey those water rights as required 
by the contract, and transfer those rights to other lands. 
9. McKellar Real Estate & Investment v. Paxton, 62 
Utah 97, 218 P. 128 (1923), is so dissimilar as to render the 
case totally inapplicable. In McKellar, the vendor agreed to 
build a hotel in a workmanlike manner. The vendee alleged 
the vendor had not substantially performed, the vendor 
disagreed. The trial court held that where the vendee 
retained possession of the hotel, made major modifications 
and changes to the building and did not assert the right to 
rescind for a substantial period of time that his inaction 
constituted a waiver and acceptance of the building. 
10. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 
P. 2d 689 (Utah 1979) was a case in which the liquor control 
commission was estopped from denying a liquor license to a 
45 
cases which arose out of the same contract of sale of a 
business• In the cases, the trial court found that the 
buyers, immediately after the transaction, discovered all the 
pertinent facts, and upon discovery of those facts made 
demand for rescission. Several months after the demand was 
refused, the buyers instituted legal action over one aspect 
of the contract, settled the lawsuit by written agreement 
which ratified and confirmed the original contract, continued 
to maintain and subsequently sold all of the merchandise. 
The court held that all those actions taken together 
constituted a waiver of both the buyer's and seller's causes 
of action. The facts of Zuniga and Leone are so 
substantially different as to make them not applicable in any 
way to the case at hand. 
3. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983) is a 
divorce case in which the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
". . .To constitute a waiver, one's actions 
or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in 
some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and 
must be inconsistent with any other intent." 
fid, at 432.) 
4. American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 
21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968), was a mortgage foreclosure 
case. The Utah Supreme Court, quoting an earlier case 
stated: 
11
 * * * a waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute a 
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, 
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it. It must be distinctly 
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potential licensee after the commission had allowed the 
potential licensee to rely upon expected approval and expend 
approximately $200,000 upon such reliance. 
11. Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980) has no 
application to the case at hand in that it involves the 
construction of a basement apartment in violation of the 
restrictive covenants of the subdivision. 
12. Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Suaarhouse Shopping Ctr. 
A. , 535 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1975) involves the enforcement of a 
restrictive covenant creating a parking easement. 
As can readily been seen by a sampling of the cases 
cited by Combes in their brief, they are not on point, and 
some hold against the position claimed by Combes. It is not 
possible to distinguish each and every string citation which 
Combes rely upon in their brief to support their claims, 
however the foregoing sampling demonstrates the extremely 
unreliable* and in some instances reckless reliance upon the 
cases cited. 
POINT NO. 9 
THE DOCTRINE THAT ONE WHO SEEKS EQUITY 
MUST DO EQUITY AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
UNCLEAN HANDS PREVENTS KEITH COMBE FROM 
RELYING UPON THE THEORY OF WAIVER, LACHES 
AND ESTOPPEL AS A DEFENSE TO THE CLAIM OF 
RESCISSION. 
It is a fundamental tenet of Equity that one seeking 
equity must do equity. Here, the guilty party, the one who 
cannot convey title as promised, now seeks to rely upon an 
equitable doctrine to avoid having to perform under the terms 
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of the contract. In addition, the guilty party, Combes want 
to retain the return of the property which they have already 
received, and in addition they want to keep all the payments 
made by the buyers. Their position is not only inequitable 
it is unreasonable and outrageous. 
POINT NO. 10 
KEITH COMBES ASSERTION THAT THE 
BIFURCATION OF THE TRIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL 
TO KEITH COMBE IS NOT WELL TAKEN. 
After the trial court had granted Plaintiffs1 Breuer-
Harrison' s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendants ATGF 
and Froerer's Motions for Summary Judgment, there was only 
one issue left to be tried in regard to Keith Combe. The 
only issue in which Keith Combe had standing to assert a 
position was the issue of the refund, if any, to be paid by 
Keith Combe to Breuer-Harrison. At that stage of the record, 
all the claims of Keith Combe against ATGF and Froerer had 
been dismissed. 
Keith Combe asserts in his Brief that he had the right 
to assert "defenses based on the wrongdoing of Froerer and 
ATGF". Since the only issue to be tried was the refund, if 
any, to be paid by Keith Combe to Breuer-Harrison, no such 
defenses were available to Keith Combe. His further 
assertion that the court's ruling gave him "inadequate 
opportunity to prepare new theories of defense" is wholly 
without merit. The only issues to be tried were: (1) What 
payments had Breuer-Harrison paid to Keith Combe and Clair 
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Combe; and (2) What was the fair market rental value of the 
property during the time that Breuer-Harrison had possession 
of the property. Any claims by Keith Combe regarding the 
wrongdoing of Froerer and ATGF as to the two issues to be 
tried would have been totally irrelevant, and as far as the 
jury was concerned would have been highly prejudicial as 
against Breuer-Harrison for the reason that Keith Combe would 
have been attempting to convince, by inference, the jury that 
insurance was involved and so the jury should reduce the 
amount Keith Combe owed to Breuer-Harrison. 
The trial court correctly determined that such claims 
were irrelevant to the issue of the payments and the fair 
market rental value and correctly granted the request for a 
bifurcation of the issues for trial. The mere assertion by 
Keith Combe that he was prejudiced does not rise to the level 
of demonstrating a prejudice. 
At the trial, the parties stipulated to the amount paid 
by Breuer-Harrison and the trial court received the 
stipulation as binding upon the parties. As a result, there 
was only one issue left to be tried, and that issue was the 
fair market rental value of the property. That issue was 
tried and a decision rendered thereon. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Breuer-Harrison seek to affirm the decision rendered by 
the Trial Court. 
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A D D E N D U M 
THIS AGREEMENT, made this 39 day of s^gM-r > \ 
A.O., 197Q , by and between KEITH ?. CCM3E and EVELYN C0M3E, his ; 
wife, ancfTlRST SECURITY 3ANK, N.A., Ocden, Utah, Trustee, ! 
hereinafter designated as Seller, and CASPER J. 5REUER and !• 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON of Fuilerton, California, hereinafter desig- I 
nated as the 3uyer. j 
WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration j 
herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the Buyer, and the 
Buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase ! 
the following described real property, situate in the County of j 
Weber, State of Utah, to-wit: j 
See Schedule A attached hereto and made a part 
hereof. ! 
1 
1. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession \ 
and pay for said described premises the sum cf FOUR HUNDRED TEN 
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY ($410,380.00) DOLLARS, (the exact | 
purchase price to be determined after survey; the purchase price ; 
to be determined by multiplying the number of acres by $21,4 00.00)! 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order _ _ _ _ _ _ ! 
loiiowmg times, :o-wi;: SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ($7 5,000.00) j 
DOLLARS cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and j 
the balance of THREE HUNDRED' THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND ZZGH7 HUNDRED j 
EIGHTY ($335,380.00) DOLLARS shall be paid as follows: j 
i 
Buyer shall pay to Seller interest only for the ! 
first four (4) years of this' contract payable on I 
the 31st day of December, beginning December 31, j 
1930. On December 31, 1983, Seller shall pay the j 
balance of the purchase price, principal and ; 
interest in full. 
1 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to 3uyer on the j 
31 day of December, 197 9. j 
2. Said payments are to be applied first to the payment! 
of interest and second to the reduction of the principal. | 
Interest shall be charged from December 31 , 1979 on ail unpaid j 
portions of the purchase price at the rate of TEN AND ONE-HAL? 
(10 1/2%) VZ^CZU'T per annum. 
3. The Buyer hereby agrees to pay a late fee of Four (4? 
Percent of any payment that is paid Fifteen (15) Days after the j 
date such payment is due. 
i 
4. In order to facilitate the performance of the terms \ 
and conditions of this agreement and to allow for the orderly j 
subdivision and development of said property by the Buyer, the j 
Seller and Buyer agree that an escrow-trust agreement designating j 
(to be mutually designated at a later date), as Escrow Agent-Trustc 
with appropriate instructions to act in such capacity shall be j 
executed by the parties. Seller shall forthwith execute and i 
deliver to said trustee a good and sufficient Warranty Deed • 
conveying subject property to said Trustee, with authority for j 
said Trustee to record said conveyance and to thereafter convey 
title by Special Warranty Deed to Buyer upon 3uyer's compliance | 
with the terms and conditions herein set forth and as specifically! 
provided for in said Escrow-Trust Agreement. Said escrow , 
EXHIBIT "A" 
agreement shall provide authority to said Trustee to execute and 
deliver deeds of reconveyance back to the Seller m tne event 
Buyer defaults. ! 
a. Such Trustee herein is authorized and instructed; 
to sign and execute, at the request of 3uyer, any and ail sub- ; 
division plats, protective covenants, easements, and rignts-of- , 
way which may be necessary or convenient for the orderly develop- I 
ment of the subject property, upon presentation of the same by i 
the 3uyer by its duly authorized representatives. 
b. The Escrow Holder-Trustee to be authorized and I 
empowered to convey all, or part, of said property to Buyer for I 
the purpose of obtaining financing for cost of installation of thej 
required off-site improvements throughout the subdivision. In 
addition, said construction mortgage or trust deed for the 
financing of said off-site improvements shall not be an amount 
to exceed the engineer's estimated cost in accordance with bids 
received from reliable contractors for the construction of such | 
improvements, and provided Trustee shall be immediately reconveyed 
all of the subject property herein after the execution and 
recordation of any such trust deed or mortgage executed by 
obligation or encumbrance. It is fully understood and agreed, 
however, that Trustee will assume no obligation nor liability i 
for the repayment of any such loan, and that all such loan pro-
ceeds shall be under the control of a reliable lending institution 
to insure compliance that such funds are expended solely for the 
purpose of the construction of the required off-site improvements, 
and for no other purpose. Seller, 3uyer and Escrow-Trustee shall 
have the right, upon request, to have an audit of expenditures of 
all such loan proceeds. Such off-site improvements may include 
engineering, road/ water system, sewer, curb and gutter, sidewalk, 
storm sewer and land fill. 
c. Neither Seller nor Escrow Holder-Trustee shall 
be under any obligation to incur any expense in connection with 
the planning, laying out, approval or development of the subject 
property/ and Buyer agrees to hold Seller and Escrow Holder-Trustee 
harmless from any liability in connection with such development. 
Neither Escrow Holder-Trustee nor Seller are in any way engaged 
in the selling of any lots or improved property hereunder, and 
that this transaction is the sale by the Seller to Buyer of 
unimproved acreage for such development purposes as the Buyer 
may elect to utilize the same. 
d. Seller hereby authorizes, empowers and instructs 
the Escrow Holder-Trustee, if requested by Buyer, to execute ail 
documents reasonably necessary to subdivide, plat, and improve 
the subject property or to annex said property or any portion 
thereof to an adjacent municipality or any water, sewer, or other 
improvement district as may be necessary or convenient, provided 
that nothing herein shall require the Escrow Holder-Trustee, or 
Seller, to furnish any bonds or other obligation in connection 
with any such development, annexation, subdivision, or the 
installation of any improvements upon any of the subject property. 
5. Buyer hereby acknowledges that it has inspected 
the premises purchased hereunder, and that it is familiar wizh 
the locution, condition and terrain thereof; that said property 
is sold hereunder on an "as is" basis only. The Seller hereoy 
expressly disclaims any and all warranties and representations, 
express or implied, as to the state of the property/ its con-
dition, quality/ character, or suitability or fitness for any sue, 
whether existing or contemplated, matters of zoning, or in ether 
respect. 
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all subsequent principal payments at the rate of one 1 
ry prorata percentage of principal received from Buyer, 
rata percentage to be determined by dividing the princi 
ance due bv the number of lots obtained in the subdivis 
payment 
uyer 
.1 C m, «. 
said 
example, - a i e *. II t 
ion. 
ty (50) lots were obtained in the subdivision 
o 
ot 
($335,380.00 divided 
the balance due was $335,880.00, Seller would release 
er one lot for every $6,717.60 of principal received (n 
nting the $75,000.00 down payment) 
50 equals $6,717.60.) 
:axes shai be ororated as of the date of final 
contract of sale. Taxes after 1979 shall be paid by 3uyer. 
3. Seller warrants that there are no liens or encum-
brances on the property hereinabove described and agrees to 
furnish to 3uyer at Seller's expense a title policy showing
 ; 
good and marketable title in said property (said title policy to 
be furnished at the time of the receipt of down payment from 
Buyer). Further, Seller agrees to execute and deliver to 3uyer, 
or assigns, good and sufficient warranty deeds covering title to 
the above described property when subdivided and as paid for in 
accordance with the terms hereinabove set out. 
In the event of a failure to comoiv wit the terms 
hereof by the 3uyer, or upon failure of the 3uyer to make any 
payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within 
thirty (30) days thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall have 
the following :ernative remedies: 
propertyj and aim polenta which he^ vQ be»eft - « • : 
e 'J. ,3 UM : J & J I J«! 
•i-^cr-eg—yi-gui-da tec—damage a fer 
1
 jii'ic thu Buyer aqrooo aha* tho-
afta,.^ se roc-
she non^Qor z Qgmar.s^ 
9*2rl e*—ma y—a t 
''•iintej arte ' ^ aice seaaeaaicn ci—said premiaea without 
l e g a l proceoGQG ac in «S-G f i r o t and fojwej i.afcate; fcoge-shor wi-1h 
rmprj'^ s:.ie:rL3 JIAC j.acition.5 rr.ace jy t.-.e juyer thereon; a 
•said additions—and—-fern provementi5 s h a l l rQn -^fw>*]reh—-fehe-—*and—and 
beu^.im „lie jrgper^ -y—&£—tehe—oe-sareg-,—£a^—3<»»ye-g—&e«omirf>c at once—a 
w v^.,1 or-tr,' 
b. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment 
for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall 
not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to one of 
tne other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default) 
or 
c. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, 
upon written notice to the 3uyer, to declare the entire 
id balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect 
reat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to 
and 
un?a 
to 
the Suyer subject thereto, and oroceed immediately to foreclose 
the 
have 
o 
the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may 
same in accordance with the laws of-the State of Utah, and 
the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment 
:he balance owing, including costs and attorney's fees; and 
remain. In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upcn 
the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to tr.e 
appointment of a receiver to t&*e possession of said mortgaged 
property and collect the rents, issues and profits therefrom and 
apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or 
hold the same pursuant to order of the court; and the Seller, 
upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the 
possession of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
10. It is agreed that time is the essence of this 
agreement. 
11. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances 
against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other 
than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the same 
by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the 3uyer may, at his 
option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit on the 
amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such 
payment or payments and thereafter the payments herein provided 
to be made, may, at the option of the 3uyer, be suspended until 
such a time as such suspended payments shall equal any sums 
advanced as aforesaid. 
12. The 3uyer and Seller each agree that should they 
default in any of the*covenants or agreements contained herein, 
that the defaulting party shall pay ail costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing this Agreement, or in obtaining possession of the 
premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such 
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise. 
13. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid 
are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHERSOF, the said parties to this agreement 
have hereunto signed their names, the day and year first above 
written. 
Kei^h ?• Combe 
asuei „jt ai sue- _ 
William M. Harrison 
3UYER 
SCHESUL:: A 
PARCEL I; ,_ -
Beginning at the Southwest corner of tne Ncr: wes: Quar er 
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running znencz 
East 238 feet, tnence North 900 feet, rr.ore or less, to the cente 
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said centerime to a 
point North of beginning, thence South 930 feet, more or less, 
to the place of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 2: 
3eginnmc at a point 753 feet East> of the Southwest corner of 
the Nortnwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Running*thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet, more 
or less, to the centeriine of Combe Road; whence Northwesterly 
along said centeriine to a point North of beginning; thence 
South 750 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
Containing 2.75 acres. 
PARCEL 3: 
Beginning at a point 937,36 feet East of the Southwest corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
.23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. 
Survey; running thence East 60.7 3 feet; thence Northeasterly 
to a point on the center of Combe Road, said point being East 
197.88 feet and North 0o04'30* West 571.02 feet to the center-
line of Combe Road s.nd Northwesterly along said centeriine 
15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centeriine of said road to 
a point North of beginning; thence South 625 feet to the place 
of beginning. 
PARCEL 4: 
Beginning at a point 233 feet East of the Southwest corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 250 feet, thence North 
835 feet, more or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence 
Northwesterly along said centeriine to a point North of 
beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or less, to the place 
of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5: 
Beginning 488 feet East of the Southwest corner of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 3ase and Meridian; 
and running thence East 275 feet, thence North 750 feet, 
more or less, to the center of the County Road, thence North-
westerly along the center of said County Road to a point 
North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of beginning, 
thence South 835 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning, 
Containing 3.40 acres. 
AMENDMENT TO R£AL. ESTATE CONTRACT 
This Amendment is made this J V ^ day of November, 1982, 
by and between XEITH ?. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter 
designated as "Sellers") and CASPER J. 3REUER and WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON of Fullerton, California (hereinafter designated as 
"Buyers"). 
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated 
December 29, 1979 for the sale of property as described in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by refer-
ence. 
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined in 
Paragraph 1 of said Contract as follows: 
"Buyers shall pay to Sellers interest only for 
the first six (6) years of this Contract, payable on 
the 31st day of December, beginning on December 31, 
1980. On December 31, 1985, Sellers shall pay the 
balance of the purchase price, principal and interest 
in full." 
Except for the above Amendment, all other terms and condi-
tions of the Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 197 9 
shall remain the same and in full force and effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have 
hereunto signed their names on the day and year first-above 
written. 
SELLERS: 
( ^a^S^/C v- L^^y^cL^ 
XEITH ?. COMBE 
•*£<. LC -^ 
EVELYN COMBE 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A. 
By: Security Title Company 
BUYERS: 
(* PLAINTIFFS \ EXHIBIT 
wt 
CASPER JL 3KEUTR 
WILLIAM M. HAilRI30tf 
This agreement is made this 3rd day cf Janu 
and between Keith F. Combe and Evelyn Combe, his 
Security Bank, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (herei. 
as "Sellers") and Casper J. Breuer and William M 
Fuiierton, California (hereinafter cesignatec as 
This Agreement amends the terms of the Real 
dated December 29, 197? for tne sale of property 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated he 
This agreement amends the terms of the sale 
Paragraph 1 of said contract as .follows: 
For the period Dec. 31, 1981 to Dec. 3 
owed 535,267.40 in interest. Seller agrees, for 
to accept a payment of $17,633.71 (one-half of t 
and to defer the payment of the balance, $17,6 33 
19S3. The deferred amount shall accrue interest 
TEN AND ONE-HALF (10 1/2%) PERCENT per annum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Ame 
hereunto signed their names on the day and year 
written. 
Wife, and First 
nafzer zesicnated 
. Harrison of 
"Buyers"). 
Estate Contract 
described in 
rein by reference. 
outlined in 
1, 1962, Seller is 
this period only, 
he amount due) 
71, until July 1, 
at the rate of 
ndment have 
first-above 
SELLERS: --
v 
KEITH P.COMBE 
'•-c.-*- • 
EVELYN COMBE 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A. 
By : ^acwriL; To. Lie Compan; 
•I* a^ » Za^iAji*=— 
BUYERS 
-•I/^<,LA^ /^-' y\A 
CASPER J. BREUER 
*
 v
 . —is ' / 
WILLIAM M. H/iRRISON 
i Pt£Ws 
This Amendment is made this ^ >' "~vday of February, 1934 by and 
between KEITH P. CCMBE and EVELYN CCMBE, his Wife, and FIRST SECURITY 
BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter designated as "Sellers") 
and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. HARRISON of Fullerton, California 
(hereinafter designated as "3uyers"). 
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated Decanber 29, 
1979 for the sale of property as described in Exhibit MAM attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined in Paragraph 
#1 of said Contract as follows: 
"Buyers shall pay to Sellers interest only for the 
first six (6) years of this Contract, payable on 
the 31st day of December, beginning on December 31, 
1980. On December 31, 1985, Sellers shall pay the 
balance of the purchase price, principal and interest 
in full. Seller does agree that when $120,000.00 or more 
is paid towards the principle during the contract period, 
that seller will extend the contract rraturity date until 
Decanber 31, 1988. Seller will accept the principle 
amount stated above in a lump sum payment or in aggre-
grate payments that will total that amount or more." 
ft' 
Real 
in full force and effect. & 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have hereunto 
signed their names on the day and year first-above written. 
bf.i ii n l w 
EVELYN COMBE 
FIRST SECURITY BA^, M.A. 
-a* 
BUYEgSr ^ 
J*- 3-^V^; /Y CJ' -uC ^vU\ 
* PLAINTIFFS 
AMENDMENT TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
This Amendment is made this .J,//" day of February, 193* 
by and between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter 
designated as "Sellers") and CASPER J. 3REUER and WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON of Fullerton, California (hereinafter designated as 
"Buyers"). 
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated 
December 29, 1979 for the sale of property as described in Exhibit 
"A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined 
in Paragraph #6 of said Contract as follows: 
"Buyer and Seller understand that a condominium 
developement is going to be constructed on the West 
15 acres of the property, i.e., the west' portion of 
Skyline Drive. The development will contain 
approximately 90 condos to be constructed in 5 phases. 
The first phase will contain 14 units on approximately 
2/2 acres. The second phase will contain 12 units 
on approximately 2li acres. As each unit sells and closes 
the seller will receive $3732.00 principle payment. 
($33 5,380 - 90). Seller agrees to subordinate the 
initial 2% acres of ground needed in the first phase 
to a construction and development Loan, the proceeds 
of which shall be strictly applied to improvements to 
the property. Seller may thereafter agree to 
subordinate additional parcels of ground upon such 
further terms and conditions as the parties may 
thereafter agree. 
j PLAINTIFFS | JXHlBfT 
I 2^_ 
rage c 
Qk°* 
Except for the above Amendment, and the Amendment dated 
day of February, 198^, ail other terms and conditions 
of the Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979, shall remain 
the same and in full force and effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have 
hereunto signed their names on the day and year first-above 
written. 
SELLERS: 
(7^4_ 
iZVELiTN CCMBE 
BUYERS: 
^ -
 rk'p •• ^ 
•JASPER j . aasyfiR-
WiLi^ AM M. HARRISON 7" 
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC. 
TW U w y r n ' Or^mmtmOmm 1m I—tim* Tttkm •• to* 
Denver, Co4or»4o 
Issued By. 
Robert E. Froerer 
(Member's Name) 
536 24th Street, Suite 2B 
(Address) 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE 
OWNERS 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE 
B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, Attorneys' Title 
Guaranty Fund, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy 
shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule 
A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, 
sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; 
4. Unmarketability of such title. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Company has caused this Policy to be signed and sealed, to be valid when 
Schedule A is countersigned by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, ail in accordance with its 
By-Laws. 
ATTEST: 
_<r£\xV\ ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTY FUNO. INC. 
**£> 
V'v BY 
f : ! S E A L ) ; | 
Fletcher Thomas. Secretary Wilford W Kirton. Jr.. President 
'zr> 
b>" 
k> 
k> 
k>'' 
£=>: 
b>:: 
*£>' 
'$£ 
!•>/ 
£>• 
PS 
PL* 
This policy must contain Schedules A and B 
duly validated by this signature: 
'\t if *. 
" « . L.A1 
J 
, 1 " 
/ ; 
D 
)? 
.tf..v..'//vf./vV/^^^./y\1v.kv./v\.v.luJi^1V:lv./v\.v./v\/v\A 
Sis 
PC' 
V 7 /J..V..V .V..V V.V .^ 
AMOUNT POLICY Of THIE INSURANCE 
SCHEDULE A 
* 410,380.00 NAME OF INSURED 
The Equitable Estate created by a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated January 9, 1980, executed by KEITH P. CCMBE, and EVELYN CCMBE, 
his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Cgden, Utah, Trustee, as 
Seller, and CASPER J* BREUER and WILLIAM ML HARRISCN, as Buyer. 
Premium $ l?fi? 50 
DATE Of POUCT 
Novrsnter 14, 1980 
at . 8:24 
o'clock_^_M. 
1. The estate or interest in the land described herein and which is covered by this policy is: 
An interest pursuant to that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract dated January 9, 198( 
by and between KEITH P. CCMBE and EVELYN^ his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Tn^stee 
as Seller, and CASPER J. BRE 
and WILLIAM M. HARRISCN, 
2. The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in 
Parcels #1 thru #4: Keith P. Ccmbe and Evelyn Caitoe 
Parcel #5: First Security Bank N.A., Trustee, and Keith P. Combe and Evelyn 
3. The land referred to in this Policy is situate in the County of. 
State of Utah, and is described as follows: 
as 
Buy< 
WEBER 
(SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE A) 
countersigned: fobert £. Froerer 
Issued ati Ogden, Weber County, Utah 
Authorised Officer or Area! 
Policy QN2 14 5 09 
THIS POLICY VALID ONLY IF SCHEDULE B IS ATTACHED 
SCHEDULE A 
PARCEL 1• 
fcifrmuTig at the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter 
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running thence 
East 233 feet, thence North 900 feet, more or less, to the center 
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said ccnterline to a 
point North of beginning, thence South 930 feet, more or less, 
to the place of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 2: 
Beg inning at a point 763 feet East of the Southwest corner of 
the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Running thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet, more 
or less, to the centerlina of Combe Road; thence Northwesterly 
along said centerline to a point North of beginning; thence 
South 750 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
Containing 2.75 acres. 
PARCEL 3: 
beginning at a point 937.36 feet East of the Southwest corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. 
Survey; running thence East 60.73 feet; thence Northeasterly 
to a point on the center of Combe Road, said point being East 
197.88 feet and North Q#04«30' West 571.02 feet to the center-
line of Combe Road and Northwesterly along said centerline 
IS feet; thence Northwesterly along centerline of said road to 
a point North of beginning; thence South 625 feet to the place 
of beginning. 
a point 238 feet East of the Southwest corner 
*cst Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Sectic 
5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
PARCEL <: 
Beginning at 
of the Northwes tion 
23, Township 
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 250 feet, thence North 
I 335 feet, more or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence 
!> Northwesterly along said centerline to a point North of 
j beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or less, to the place 
\of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
V PARC£L 5: 
I beginning 438 feet East of the Southwest corner of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
and running thence East 275 feet, thence North 750 feet, 
mure or less, to the center of the County Road, thence North-
westerly along the center of said County Road to a point 
North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of beginning, 
thence South 835 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS—CONTINUED 
ptlons to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
e^ Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle tor or in the name 
insured claimant any claim insured against or to terminate all iiapiiity and 
aiions of the Company hereunder py paying or tendering payment of the 
jnt o* insurance under this ooncy together with any costs attorneys tees and 
nses incurred uo to tne time of sucn payment or tender ot payment Py tne 
ed claimant and authored Dv the Company 
nomination and Payment of LOSS 
he iiaoiiity of tne Company under tn?s policy shall in no case exceed the least 
i tne actual ioss of tne insured claimant or 
i tne amount of insurance stated m Schedule A 
he Company win pay m addition to any loss insured against py this policy ai» 
imposed uoon an insured m litigation earned on py the Company tor sucn 
ec and an costs attorneys tees and exoensesm litigation earned on py such 
ed w.m tne written autnomation of the Company 
vnen i.aothty nas oeen definitely fixed m accordance with the conditions of 
>oiicy tne ioss or damage snail oe payaoie witnm 30 days thereafter 
rotation of UsOlllty 
C 3 » s ^ ?' fs<> c nerr.a ma r*ar *• ,^de' mi? pone v ia> if me Comoany atte# 
g receded not.ee of an alleged defect nen or encumorance insured against 
mde' by litigation or otherwise removes such detect den or encumorance 
tab S^PS me t.tie as >nsu'ea *•!*•*" a reasonaoie time after receiot of sucn 
p (Pi m tne e*en: of litigation until there has be^r\ a final determination py a 
o'competent IU*" sdict<on and disposition of an aopeais therefrom adverse 
t tine as insurec as provided m paragraph 3 hereof or (c) for iiaoiiity 
tamy assumed P> an insured m settling any claim or suit witnout prior written 
»nt of the Company 
juctlon of Liability 
payments under this policy exceot payments made tor costs attorneys 
mo exoenses snail reduce the amount of the insurance pro tanto No 
pnt snail be made without producing this policy for endorsement of such 
?nt umess the policy be lost or destroyed m which case proof of such loss or 
jct.on snail be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company 
iblllty Noncumulatlve 
s expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall 
Juced by any amount the Company may pay under any policy insuring either 
mortgage snown or referred to m Schedule B hereof which is a lien on the 
» or m'erest covered by this policy or (b) a mortgage hereafter executed by 
,ured which is a charge or lien on the estate or interest described or referred 
Schedule A and the amount so paid snail be deemed a payment under this 
1 The Company shall have the option to apply to the payment of any such 
jages any amount that otherwise would be payable hereunder to the insured 
r of the estate or interest covered by this policy and the amount so paid snail 
be deemed a payment under this policy to said insured owner 
10. Apportionment ^ 
if the land aescnoed m Schedule A consists of two or more parcels whicn a 
not used as a single sue and a ioss is established affecting one or more of sa 
parcels but not an the ioss snatt be comouted anc settled on a oro rata oasis as 
the amount of insurance unoer this poi«cv was divided pro rata as to tne vaii 
on Oate of Poiicv o4 each separate parcel to me wnoie exclusive of any im-
provements maoe suoseouent to Oate of Policy umess a ••^oiiity or value n 
otherwise oe^r> agreed uoon as to each sucn parcel by me Company and ti 
insured at the time of tne issuance of mis policy and shown py an expre 
statement nerem or by ar\ endorsement attached hereto 
11. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement 
Whenever the Comoany snaif nave settled a claim under this poi»cy an ngnt 
subrogation snail vest m me Company unaffected by any act of me msun 
claimant The Comoany snail be subrogated to and be entitled to an rights ai 
remedies wnich such insured claimant would have nad agamst any person 
property in resoect to sucn claim nad this poncy not Q^er\ issued and if repuesti 
by tne Comoany such insured claimant shall transfer to the Company an rigr 
and remedies agamst any oerson or property necessary m order to perfect su< 
ngnt of suOrogation and snail permit me Company to use the name of su< 
insured claimant m any transaction or litigation involving such ngntsor remedn 
n tne payment does not co.er me loss of such insured claimant me Compai 
snail be subrogated to sucn rights and remedies m me proportion which sa 
payment bears tp the amount of said loss If loss should result t-om any act of sui 
insured claimant such act shall not void this poncy but the Company m m 
event snail be reputed to pay only that pan of any losses insured agair 
hereunder which snail exceed the amount if any lost to the Company by reason 
the impairment of the ngnt of subrogation 
12. Liability Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments if ar 
attached hereto by the Comoany is me entire poncy and contract between ti 
insured and me Company 
Any claim of loss or damage wnether or not based on negligence and wh»< 
arises out of the status of me title to the estate or interest covered hereoy or ai 
action asserting such claim shall be restricted to the provisions and conditio) 
and stipulations of this policy 
No amendment of or endorsement to this oolicy can be made except I 
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President a Vu 
President the Secretary and Assistant Secretary or validating officer 
authorized signatory of the Company 
13. Notices. Where Sent 
All notices required to be given the Comoany and any statement m wntu 
required to be furmsned me Company shall be addressed tp as Home Office 
THIS POLICY IS NOT TRANSFERABLE TO SUBSEQUENT OWNERS A REISSUE POLICY IN FAVOR OF NEW PURCHASERS SHOULD BE OBTAINED 
ALIA Own#r i Poi.cy 
form S 1970 A / w d . d 10-17.70 b i . I U . D L L t ii 
This policy docs not insure against loss by reason of the following. 
UTAH (Oww'si 510 
PART ONE: This part of Schedule B refers to matters which, if any such exist, may affect the title to said land, but which 
are nut shown in this policy: 
1. Taxes or assessments which arc not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing agency or by the public rec-
ords, and casements, liens or encumbrances which arc not shown by the public records. 
2. Rii'htb or claim* of persons »n possession of said land which are not shown by the public records. 
3. Any facts, rights, interest, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by an 
inspection of said land, or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof, or by a correct survey. 
4. M nine claims, reservations in patents, water rights, claims or title to water. 
5. Proceedings for municipal improvement, which, at the date hereof, are shown by the official records of any such city, 
but have not resulted in the imposition of a lien upon, or establishment of an easement over, or adjudication of the 
right to a public use of said land or any part thereof. 
PART TWO. This pan of Schedule B shows liens, encumbrances, defects and other matters affecting the title to said land 
or to which said title is subject: 
Taxes for year 1980 are a lien, not yet due. Tax I.D. numbers: #1, 07-086-0033? 
#2, 07-086-0039; #3, 07-086-0040; #4, 07-086-0034; #5, 07-086-0016. 
Property is subject to easements to the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Canpany 
as described by document recorded in Book 1267, page 281 in the records of Weber County. 
Property is within the boundaries of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, and the 
Uintah Highlands Sewer Inprovement District, and is subject to any and all assessments 
levied by said districts. 
Unrecorded Peal Estate Contract dated January 9, 1980, by and between KEITH P. CCMBE 
and EVELYN COMBE, his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Trustee, as Seller, and 
CASPER J. BREUER, and WILLIAM M. HARRISCN, as Buyer. 
The Company shall assume no liability under this policy to the extent that loss or 
damage arises from failure to record the instrument or instruments necessary to 
evidence the estate or interest covered by this policy. 
Right of Trustee or Receiver in the even of bankruptcy, receivership or insolvency-
of the Seller to repudiate the Contract. 
This policy does not insure or guarantee performance by the Seller, his heirs, 
successors and assigns, under the Terms of the Contract. 
Property taxes for 1978 and 1979 are a lien on Parcel #1 and Parcel #4. Amount due 
on Parcel #1: $581.30 for 1978, $552.59 for 1979. Arount due on Parcel #4: $581.30 
1978 and $552.59 for 1979. 
!ountcrsiened: Robert E. Froerer 
Autfiorued Officer or Agent 
POLICY SERIAL NO. O- 14509 
The typed serial number above MUST be the same 
as the printed serial number on Schedule A. 
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC. 
COVERAGE SAME AS A. L. T A OWNER'S POLICY. FORM B 1970 AMENDED 10-17-70 
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy 
1 Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances) 
restricting or regulating or prohibiting the occupancy use or enjoyment of the land, or regulating the character, 
dimensions or location of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in 
ownership or a reduction in the dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law, 
ordinance or governmental regulation. 
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police powerunlessnoticeof the exercise of such rights ap-
pears in the public records at Date of Policy 
3 Defects hens encumbrances adverse claims or other matters (a) created suffered, assumed or agreed to by 
the insured claimant, (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the in-
sured claimant either at Date of Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by 
this policy and not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured 
claimant became an insured hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant, (d) attaching 
or created subsequent to Date of Policy, or (e) resultmq in loss or damage which would not have been sustained 
if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
Definition of Terms 
The fo"owmg terms when used m m-s policy me»o 
(at tnsu^ed the insured named «n Schedule A ana subject to any ngnts or 
efenses tr« Company may nave nao against the named insured mose who 
ucceed to tne interest of such ."•sured bv ooerat'on o< law as oisnnouisned from 
lurcnase including out not Urr ted to ne«rs distnouiees devisees survivors 
ie'sonai representatives neit of *m or corporate or fiduciary successors 
(D) insured claimant an insured cta>ming loss or damage nereunoe' 
<ci Knowledge actual Knowledge not constructive *now<edge O' notice 
vhicn may oe imputed to an insured by reason o< any pudnc records 
id) land the land descr.oed soecrf'cafiy or by reference m Schedule A and 
morovements affixed thereto which Dy <aw constitute real property provided 
however me term land does not include any property beyonc the imes of the 
irea specifically descnoed or referred to m Schedule A nor any ngnt title 
nterest estate or easement <r abutting streets roaos avenues alleys tanes wavs 
3* ^ate-^ays Out notnmg nerem snai '-odify or limit the extent to which a ngnt of 
access to ano f'om me iano is msuied Ov this policy 
<e) mortgage mortgage deed of trust trust deed or other security 
nsuumen* 
(t) public records tnose records wnicn by law tmoart constructive notice of 
matters relating to said iana 
2. Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Tide 
The ccverageof m-s pot'Cy shall continue m force as of Oateof Policy m favor of 
an insured so long as sucn insured retains an estate or interest m the 'and or noios 
an indebtedness "secured by a ourcnase money mortgage given by a ou'enaser 
from such insured or so long as such insured shall have iiaoiiity by reason of 
covenants of warranty made by such insured m any transfer or conveyance of 
such estate or interest provided however tnispot'Cy shall not continue m force m 
favor o< an/ purchaser from such insured o< either said estate or interest or the 
indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured 
3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions — Notice of Claim to be Given by an 
insured Claimant 
(at The Company at its own cost and without undue delay shall provide for the 
defense of so insured m ail litigation consisting of actions or proceedings 
commenced agamst such insured to the extent that such litigation is founded 
upon an alleged defect lien encumbrance or other matter insured against by this 
policy 
(bi The insured shall notify the Comoany promptly m writing (o m case an 
action or proceed * - is begun as set forth in (aiaoove lnMncasexnowteogesna 
come to an msurt- e'eunoer o< any claim of title or interest which <s adverse t 
me titie to me est* r^ interest as insured ano which mioht cause lossor damag 
•or wmch me Con- -y may be liable by virtue of this poucy it such prompt none 
shan not oe give' z me Company men as to sucn insured aft liability of tr 
Company shau Cf-*-» and terminate m reqard to me matter o' matters tor wmc 
sucn prompt no*'CP s recused provided nowever that fa u<e ro notify snaiim r 
case prejudice fne ngnts ot any such insured unoer m»s policy unless tr 
Company snaii oe prejudiced by sucn failure and then on»v to the extent of su< 
prejudice 
(O The Comoany snaii nave the rignt at its own cost to institute and wctho 
undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to 00 any other act which m i 
oomion may be necessary or desirable to establish me title to me estate or inter* 
as insured ano me Company may tane any appropriate action under the terms 
this policy whether or not it snail be liable thereunder and snail not there' 
concede uabiiny or waive any provision ot this poucy 
(d) Whenever me Company snail have brought any action or interposed 
defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this policy the Ccmpa 
may pursue any such litigation to tmai determination py a court of compet« 
jurisdiction and exoressiy reserves tne right in its soie discretion to apoeai frc 
any adverse judgment or order 
fe> in an cases where this ooiicy permits or reouires.tne Company to proseci 
or provide for me defense of any action or proceeding the insured hereunder sfi 
secure to the Comoany me ngnt to so orosecute or provide defense «n such acti 
or proceeding and at' aopeais therein ana permit me Company to use at 
ootion me name of sucn insured for such purpose Whenever requested by 1 
Company such insured snail give the Comoany an reasonable aid m any si. 
action or proceeding m effecting settlement securing evidence obtain 
witnesses or prosecuting or defending such action or proceeding ancj 
Company shall reimburse such insured tor any expense so incurred 
4. Notice of Loss—Limitation of Action 
in addition to the notices required under paragraph 3 fb) of these Conditu 
and Stipulations a statement m writing of any toss or damage for which i 
claimed the Company is liable under this policy snail be furnished to me Compi 
within 90 days after sucn loss or damage snail have oeen determined and no n 
of action shall accrue to an insured claimant until 30 days after such statem 
shau have been furnished failure to furnish such statement of loss or dam, 
shall terminate any liability of the Company under this policy as to such tost 
damage 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, feTAT^O^ 
BRUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER ; 
J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. ] 
HARRISON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE | 
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, and ] 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
Trustee, ! 
Defendants. 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, ] 
and FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., ] 
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for ] 
PHILIP COMBE, ] 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. 
CASPER J. BREUER and 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON 
Case No. 
) Case No. 
\ 
MOTIONS 
90135 . 
907 93 
fN 
The parties entered into a Real Estate Contract, 
Paragraph 8 of which states, "Seller warrants that there are no 
liens or encumbrances on the property herein above described, and 
agrees to furnish to Buyer, at Sellers expense, a title policy 
showing good and marketable title in said property (said title 
policy to be furnished at the time of the receipt of down payment 
^ * a 1 "P" Ai nut 1 o ..3?.Di i 
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from Buyer). Further, Seller agrees to execute and deliver to 
Buyer, or assigns, good and sufficient warranty deeds covering 
title to the above described property when subdivided and as paid 
for in accordance with the terms hereinabove set out." 
(In regard to the sellers claim that Paragraph 5 makes 
it an "as is" sale, without warranties, I hold that Paragraph 5 
is speaking of the physical condition of the property, and has 
nothing to do with the warranties of title as set out Paragraph 
8.) The original contract was dated January 9, 1980. It was 
amended four times, but at no time was Paragraph 8 altered and 
the amendments stated and all other terms and conditions shall 
remain the same. 
It turns out that there is a 30 foot wide easement 
traversing the property diagonally in a northwest direction and 
in the easement is an irrigation aqueduct of substantial size. 
The easement is not listed in the Real Estate Contract as an 
exception to Paragraph 8. 
There is argument between the parties as to when the 
buyers knew of the easement; sellers claiming they knew all along 
and buyers claiming they knew sometime in 1983. The buyers claim 
that the sellers committed an anticipatory breach of contract, in 
that they are now and will always be unable to supply a warranty 
deed free of the easement. The sellers make no claim that they 
can relieve the property of the easement by having the pipeline 
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changed. Admittedly, they cannot comply with Paragraph 8 of 
their contract. I find that the doctrine of anticipatory breach 
is applicable in this case, as the sellers are unable to perform 
their obligation under the contract to convey fee simple, 
unencumbered title to the buyers. I further find that the 
easement is not a minor inconvenience, but is a substantial 
encumbrance to fee title. 
I further find that waiver is not a defense to their 
inability to perform. 
There are various remedies for anticipatory breach, and 
the buyer is not required to immediately make an election or be 
held to waive his right to rescind the contract. The purchaser 
is entitled to a deed which conveys the fee simple title to the 
land without the easement and is not required to accept a defec-
tive title. The Glasmann case cited by both parties, which has 
stood for 80 years, rather hits the nail on the head, wherein it 
states, "The respondent contracted to furnish a good title, and 
the fact that he was unable to do so is his misfortune, and not 
the fault of the appellant." 
The contract being subject to rescission, the buyer may 
be entitled to some refund of payments. If the parties cannot 
arrive at an agreement between themselves, they are instructed to 
contact the calendar clerk and have the matter set for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
47 
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The buyers1 motion for summary judgment seeking 
rescission is granted. 
Whereas the ruling granting summary judgment for 
rescission ends the contract between the parties, the sellers 
action for foreclosure falls of its own weight. The buyers' 
motion for summary judgment dismissing the sellers complaint for 
foreclosure is granted. 
The buyers1 counsel to prepare findings, conclusions and 
judgment in accordance herewith. 
DATED this / rf day of March, 1986. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this I ; day of March, 1986, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motions was 
served upon the following: 
Jack L. Schoenhdls 
Attorney for Bruer-Harrison 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84101 
Erik Strindberg 
Attorney for Defendants Combe 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James 2. Davis 
Attorney for Defendant First Security Bank 
1020 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
David C. West 
1300 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffry R. Burton 
2606 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
Jack L. Schoenhals #2881 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-8823 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT A. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, AND 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A. , 
TRUSTEE, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 90135 
fl 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
OGDEN, UTAH, AS TRUSTEE FOR 
PHILIP COMBE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASPER J. BREUER AND 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
C i v i l No. 90793 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d ma t t e r came on r e g u l a r l y for hea r ing 
b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e Rona ld 0. Hyde, one of the Judges of 
EXHIBIT D 
t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d C o u r t , i n h i s c o u r t r o o m on t h e 19 th day 
of D e c e m b e r , 1 9 8 5 , a t t h e hour of 2 :00 p . m . , t h e P l a i n t i f f s , 
B r e a e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , C a s p e r J . B r e u e r a n d W i l l i a m M. 
H a r r i s o n , w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by J a c k L. S c h o e n h a l s , t h e 
D e f e n d a n t s , K e i t h P . C o m b e a n d E v e l y n C o m b e , w e r e 
r e p r e s e n t e d by J o h n A s h t o n , t h e D e f e n d a n t , R o b e r t E. 
F r o e r e r , was n o t p r e s e n t or r e p r e s e n t e d , t h e De fendan t T i t l e 
G u a r a n t y F u n d was r e p r e s e n t e d by D a v i d W e s t , a n d t h e 
D e f e n d a n t F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank was r e p r e s e n t e d by James Z. 
D a v i s , t h e C o u r t h a v i n g r e v i e w e d t h e f i l e s and r e c o r d s i n 
t h i s m a t t e r and h a v i n g h e a r d a rgumen t of c o u n s e l and h a v i n g 
M e m o r a n d u m s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e C o u r t and h a v i n g r e v i e w e d t h e 
s a m e and h a v i n g e n t e r e d i t s R u l i n g on M o t i o n s , now makes and 
e n t e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . C a s p e r J . B r e u e r a n d W i l l i a m M. H a r r i s o n , a s 
b u y e r s ; and K e i t h P. Combe, Eve lyn Combe, and F i r s t S e c u r i t y 
B a n k , N . A . , T r u s t e e , a s s e l l e r s , e n t e r e d i n t o a r e a l e s t a t e 
c o n t r a c t d a t e d J a n u a r y 9, 1 9 8 0 . 
2 . P u r s u a n t t o t h e t e r m s of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , 
t h e b u y e r s made a down payment of $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
3 . A-L i-riie Lime of t h e p u r c h a s e of t h e p r o p e r t y and t h e 
e-jt<iuu LTtra—of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , t h e s e l l e r s p a i d f o r 
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a p o l i c y of t i t l e i n s u r a n c e , which was i s sued to the buyers 
as i n s u r e d s . 
4 . The b u y e r s and t h e s e l l e r s e n t e r e d i n t o f o u r 
a m e n d m e n t s t o t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t which a l t e r e d the 
t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s of the payments due under the terms of 
the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
5 . Even t h o u g h t h e b u y e r s and s e l l e r s en t e r ed i n t o 
a m e n d m e n t s t o t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , a t no time was 
p a r a g r a p h 8 of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t a l t e r e d and the 
a m e n d m e n t s p r o v i d e d t h a t " . . . a l l o t h e r t e r m s and 
c o n d i t i o n s of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t da ted December 29, 
1979 s h a l l remain the same and in f u l l fo rce and e f f e c t . " 
6 . The r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t r e q u i r e s the s e l l e r s to 
e x e c u t e and d e l i v e r t o t h e b u y e r s or a s s i g n s , good and 
s u f f i c i e n t warranty deeds cover ing t i t l e of the p r o p e r t y . 
7 . T h e r e i s a 30 f o o t wide easement which t r a v e r s e s 
t h e p r o p e r t y d i a g o n a l l y in a nor thwest d i r e c t i o n and wi th in 
t h a t easement i s an i r r i g a t i o n aquaduct of s u b s t a n t i a l s i z e . 
8 . The easement and the aquaduct are n e i t h e r d e s c r i b e d 
i n t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t nor a re they excepted from t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n s of t h e s e l l e r s t o convey good and s u f f i c i e n t 
war ran ty deeds f ree and c l e a r of l i e n s and encumbrances. 
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9. The e x i s t e n c e of the easement and the aquaduct were 
n o t d i s c l o s e d by t h e s e l l e r s to the b u y e r s , were not noted 
i n t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , or shown as an excep t ion in the 
p o l i c y of t i t l e i n su rance i s sued to the b u y e r s . 
1 0 . I n t h e f i r s t p a r t of t h e y e a r 1 9 8 3 , Combes 
d i s c l o s e d the e x i s t e n c e of the easement to the buyer s 1 agent 
a t w h i c h t i m e a new t i t l e r e p o r t was p r e s e n t e d t o the 
buye r s 1 agent which d i s c l o s e d the e x i s t e n c e of the easement . 
1 1 . There i s a d i s p u t e of f a c t as to t h e exac t da t e a t 
w h i c h t h e b u y e r s became a w a r e of t h e e x i s t e n c e of the 
easement and became aware of the e x i s t e n c e of the aquaduct . 
1 2 . Pa rag raph 5 of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n i n g 
t h e p h r a s e "as i s " p e r t a i n s t o the p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of the 
p r o p e r t y and has noth ing to do with the w a r r a n t i e s of t i t l e 
w h i c h a r e d e a l t w i t h s e p a r a t e l y in paragraph 8 of the r e a l 
e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
1 3 . The s e l l e r s have made no c l a i m t h a t t h e y can 
r e l i e v e t h e p r o p e r t y of the easement and/or t h a t they can 
have the p i p e l i n e removed from the p r o p e r t y . 
1 4 . The s e l l e r s cannot comply with paragraph 8 of t he 
r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and c a n n o t convey t i t l e to the r e a l 
p r o p e r t y f r e e and c l e a r of the easement and the aquaduc t . 
- 4 -
1 5 . The e x i s t e n c e of the easement and the aquaduct i s 
n o t a m i n o r i n c o n v e n i e n c e b u t i s i n s t e a d a s u b s t a n t i a l 
encumbrance to the fee t i t l e to the p r o p e r t y . 
1 6 . The s e l l e r s were not o b l i g a t e d to convey t i t l e to 
t h e b u y e r s u n t i l t he buyers made payment of the ba lance due 
in f u l l to the s e l l e r s . 
1 7 . At no t i m e , up t o and i nc lud ing the da te of the 
h e a r i n g of t h i s m o t i o n , d i d t h e buyers t ende r the e n t i r e 
b a l a n c e of t h e c o n t r a c t and demand conveyance of the fee 
simple t i t l e . 
1 8 . The s e l l e r s , because they cannot comply with the 
t e r m s of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and convey unencumbered 
f e e t i t l e t o t h e p r o p e r t y , a r e g u i l t y of an a n t i c i p a t o r y 
breach of the c o n t r a c t . 
1 9 . S i n c e t h e s e l l e r s cannot perform t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n 
u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e R e a l E s t a t e C o n t r a c t and cannot 
c o n v e y f e e t i t l e , by w a r r a n t y deed, f r e e and c l e a r of the 
e a s e m e n t and a q u a d u c t , t h e b u y e r s a r e r e l i e v e d of any 
f u r t h e r o b l i g a t i o n t o per form under the terms of the r e a l 
e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
2 0 . T h e r e i s no c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t of the buyers 
w h i c h i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e b u y e r s e l e c t e d t o t r e a t t h e 
a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h as a breach of the c o n t r a c t u n t i l the 
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b u y e r s f i l e d l e g a l a c t i o n and a l l e g e d t h a t t he s e l l e r s were 
g u i l t y of an a n t i c i p a t o r y b reach . 
2 1 . The b u y e r s made a s u b s t a n t i a l e f f o r t , over a 
s u b s t a n t i a l p e r i o d of t i m e , to see if they could m i t i g a t e 
t h e i r damages and/or m i t i g a t e the impact of the easement and 
t h e a q u a d u c t upon t h e p r o p e r t y , and in t h i s r e g a r d , they 
h i r e d the s e r v i c e s of v a r i o u s eng inee r s and examined s e v e r a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e m e t h o d s of deve lop ing the p r o p e r t y around the 
easement and the aquaduc t . 
2 2 . The buyers became aware, t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of t he 
e a s e m e n t and t h e a q u a d u c t i n t e r f e r e d with t h e i r proposed 
development of t h e p r o p e r t y . 
23 . The easement was not shown on any s k e t c h e s or p l a t 
m a p s g i v e n t o t h e b u y e r s p r i o r t o t h e t i m e t h a t t h e y 
purchased t h e p r o p e r t y . 
2 4 . The f i r s t t i m e t h e e a s e m e n t was shown on any 
d r a w i n g s p r e p a r e d by Great Basin Engineer ing was a f t e r the 
new t i t l e r e p o r t was g i v e n by the s e l l e r s t o -he buyers 1 
agent in 1983. 
2 5 . The r e a l p r o p e r t y r e m a i n s in t h e same p h y s i c a l 
c o n d i t i o n as i t was when the o r i g i n a l r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t 
was executed between the buyers and t h e s e l l e r s . 
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26 . The b u y e r s made a t i m e l y e l e c t i o n to claim an 
a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h of the con t rac t , and/or to rescind the 
c o n t r a c t . After the buyers made t h e i r e lec t ion to claim an 
a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h a n d / o r t o r e s c i n d t h e con t rac t , by 
f i l i n g l e g a l a c t i o n , t h e r e i s no evidence that the buyers 
engaged in any c o n d u c t which could cons t i t u t e a waiver of 
t h e i r r i g h t to e l e c t to a c t upon the an t i c ipa to ry breach 
and/or to rescind the con t rac t . 
2 7 . The q u e s t i o n of t h e r e f u n d t o be p a i d by the 
s e l l e r s to the buyers i s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t . If the p a r t i e s 
c a n n o t a r r i v e a t an agreement between themselves as to the 
amoun t t o be r e f u n d e d , t h e q u e s t i o n of the amount of t he 
r e f u n d w i l l h a v e t o be r e s e r v e d f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n at a 
f u t u r e da te a f t e r an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . 
The c o u r t hav ing made and en t e r ed i t s F ind ings of Fact 
now makes and e n t e r s the fo l lowing : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The s e l l e r s a r e unable to perform under the terms 
of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and convey unencumbered fee 
simple t i t l e to the buyers. 
2 . The easement and the aquaduct contained within the 
easement c o n s t i t u t e a subs t an t i a l encumbrance to fee t i t l e . 
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3 . The b u y e r s are re l ieved of any fur ther ob l iga t ions 
under t h e t e rms of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and/or are 
e n t i t l e d to a resc i s ion of the rea l e s t a t e con t r ac t . 
4. The buyers did not waive t h e i r r ight to require the 
s e l l e r s to p e r f o r m under t h e t e rms of t h e r e a l e s t a t e 
con t r ac t . 
5 . Waiver of t h e r i g h t of the buyers to require the 
s e l l e r s t o pe r fo rm and/or to rescind the contract i s not a 
d e f e n s e to the s e l l e r s ' i n a b i l i t y to perform under the fac ts 
of t h i s case . 
6. A f t e r t h e b u y e r s e lected to act upon the s e l l e r s ' 
a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h of t h e c o n t r a c t and t o seek to be 
r e l i e v e d of the ob l iga t ion of further performance under the 
t e rms of t h e c o n t r a c t a n d / o r t o rescind the con t r ac t , by 
f i l i n g l e g a l ac t ion , there is no evidence of any conduct on 
t h e p a r t of t h e b u y e r s which would c o n s t i t u t e a waiver of 
t h e i r r i g h t t o r e q u i r e t h e s e l l e r s to perform, or to be 
r e l i e v e d of f u r t h e r obl iga t ion under the terms of the rea l 
e s t a t e cont rac t and/or to rescind the con t r ac t . 
7. The buyers are e n t i t l e d to a deed which conveys fee 
s i m p l e unencumbered t i t l e to the land without the easement 
and t h e a q u a d u c t and the buyers are not required to accept 
defec t ive t i t l e . 
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8 . The r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t r e q u i r e s the s e l l e r s to 
c o n v e y f e e s i m p l e , u n e n c u m b e r e d t i t l e wh ich t i t l e 
d e m o n s t r a t e s good and m a r k e t a b l e t i t l e , f ree and c l e a r of 
the e x i s t e n c e of the easement and the aquaduct . 
9 . The a m e n d m e n t s e n t e r e d i n t o by and between the 
p a r t i e s do n o t r e l i e v e t h e s e l l e r s of the o b l i g a t i o n to 
convey fee s imple unencumbered t i t l e to the buye r s . 
10 . The Mas i s " p r o v i s i o n s con ta ined in paragraph 5 of 
t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t r e l a t e to the p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of 
t h e p r o p e r t y and have nothing to do with w a r r a n t i e s of t i t l e 
as s e t f o r t h in paragraph 8 of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
1 1 . The s e l l e r s have made no c l a i m t h a t t h e y can 
r e l i e v e t h e p r o p e r t y of the easement by having t h e easement 
and the p i p e l i n e changed or removed. 
1 2 . The d o c t r i n e of a n t i c i p a t o r y breach i s a p p l i c a b l e 
in t h i s c a s e and t h e s e l l e r s a r e unable to perform t h e i r 
o b l i g a t i o n u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t t o c o n v e y f e e s i m p l e 
unencumbered t i t l e to the buye r s . 
1 3 . The b u y e r s had s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e r e m e d i e s 
a v a i l a b l e a r i s i n g o u t of t h e a n t i c i p a t o r y breach of t he 
c o n t r a c t by t h e s e l l e r s . The buyers 'were not r e q u i r e d to 
i m m e d i a t e l y make an e l e c t i o n to ac t upon the a n t i c i p a t o r y 
b r e a c h of the c o n t r a c t , or to seek to be r e l i e v e d of f u r t h e r 
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o b l i g a t i o n t o p e r f o r m u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t , 
a n d / o r t o r e s c i n d the c o n t r a c t or t h e r e f o r e be held to have 
waived t h e i r r i g h t t o so a c t , 
1 4 . The Gla s sman c a s e c i t e d by t h e buyers and t h e 
s e l l e r s " h i t s the n a i l on the head", wherein i t s t a t e s , " the 
r e s p o n d e n t c o n t r a c t e d to fu rn i sh a good t i t l e , and the f a c t 
t h a t he was u n a b l e t o do so i s h i s m i s f o r t u n e , and not t he 
f a u l t of t h e a p p e l l a n t . " 
15 . The c o n t r a c t i s s u b j e c t to r e s c i s i o n . 
1 6 . The b u y e r s may be e n t i t l e d to some refund of the 
p a y m e n t s m a d e . I f t h e p a r t i e s c a n n o t e n t e r i n t o an 
a g r e e m e n t as to the refund to be made, t he p a r t i e s a re to be 
d i r e c t e d t o r e q u e s t a d a t e f o r an e v i d e n t i a r y hea r ing so 
t h a t the ma t t e r can be r e s o l v e d . 
1 7 . A p a r t i a l summary judgment should be g ran ted to 
t h e b u y e r s d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e s e l l e r s a r e u n a b l e to 
p e r f o r m u n d e r the terms of the c o n t r a c t , the buyers are not 
o b l i g a t e d t o f u r t h e r p e r f o r m u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e 
c o n t r a c t , and /o r t he buyers a re e n t i t l e d to r e s c i s i o n of t h e 
r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
1 8 . The f a c t t h a t t h e buyers a re e n t i t l e d to a summary 
j u d g m e n t d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t the s e l l e r s a re unable to perform 
u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t , t h e b u y e r s a r e n o t 
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o b l i g a t e d t o f u r t h e r p e r f o r m u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e 
c o n t r a c t , a n d / o r a re e n t i t l e d to r e s c i s i o n of the c o n t r a c t , 
e n d s t h e c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s , and the s e l l e r s 1 
a c t i o n for f o r e c l o s u r e f a l l s of i t s own weigh t . 
1 9 . A summary j u d g m e n t should be en te red d i s m i s s i n g 
the s e l l e r s ' complaint for f o r e c l o s u r e . 
2 0 . A p a r t i a l summary judgment should be e n t e r e d by 
t h e c o u r t i n c o r p o r a t i n g the d e c i s i o n of the cou r t i n t o the 
p a r t i a l summary judgment. 
Dated t h i s £_ day of A p r i l / J 1 9 8 6 . 
COURT: 
'f^ffiJi+dU 
RONALD 0. HYDE, "JUDGE 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT A. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, AND 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
TRUSTEE, 
Defendants. 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
OGDEN, UTAH, AS TRUSTEE FOR 
PHILIP COMBE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASPER J. BREUER AND 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. 90135 
C i v i l No. 90793 
•\J 
EXHIBIT E. 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d ma t t e r came on r e g u l a r l y for hea r ing 
b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e Ronald 0. Hyde, one of t he Judges of 
t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d Cour t , in h i s courtroom on the 19th day 
of D e c e m b e r , 1 9 8 5 , a t t h e hour of 2:00 o ' c l o c k , p .m. , t he 
P l a i n t i f f s , E r e u e r - H a r r i son , I n c . , Casper J . Breuer and 
W i l l i a m M. H a r r i s o n , were r e p r e s e n t e d by Jack L. Schoenha l s , 
t h e D e f e n d a n t s , K e i t h P . Combe and E v e l y n Combe, were 
r e p r e s e n t e d by J o h n A s h t o n , t h e D e f e n d a n t , R o b e r t E. 
F r o e r e r , was not p r e s e n t or r e p r e s e n t e d , t h e Defendant T i t l e 
G u a r a n t y Fund was r e p r e s e n t e d by D a v i d W e s t , and t h e 
D e f e n d a n t F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank was r e p r e s e n t e d by James Z. 
D a v i s , t h e C o u r t h a v i n g reviewed the f i l e s and r e c o r d s in 
t h i s m a t t e r and having heard argument of counse l and having 
Memorandums s u b m i t t e d to t h e Court and having reviewed t h e 
same and having e n t e r e d i t s Ruling, on Mot ions , now makes and 
e n t e r s t he f o l l o w i n g : 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as f o l l o w s : 
1 . The P l a i n t i f f s , B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , Casper J . 
B r e u e r and Wil l iam M. H a r r i s o n 1 s Motion for Summary Judgment 
b e a n d t h e s a m e i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d and i t i s h e r e b y 
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e s e l l e r s Kei th P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, 
and t h e F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank a re unable t o perform under t h e 
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t e r m s of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and a re unable t o convey 
u n e n c u m b e r e d fee s imple t i t l e to the b u y e r s . I t i s f u r t h e r 
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e b u y e r s a r e r e l i e v e d of any f u r t h e r 
o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r t h e t e r m s of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
T h e e f f e c t of t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e c o u r t i s t o g r a n t 
P l a i n t i f f s a r e s c i s s i o n of t he r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t en t e r ed 
i n t o by and between the sa id P l a i n t i f f s and Defendants . 
2 . K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and The F i r s t S e c u r i t y 
B a n k , N.A., Ogden Utah, as T rus t ee for P h i l i p Combe's Motion 
f o r Summary Judgment a g a i n s t Casper J . Breuer and Will iam M. 
H a r r i s o n , be and the same i s hereby den ied , 
3 . B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , Casper J . Breuer and William 
M. H a r r i s o n may be e n t i t l e d t o some refund of payments made 
t o K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and The F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank, 
N . A . , Ogden U t a h , a s T r u s t e e for P h i l i p Combe. As t o The 
F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank, N.A., Ogden Utah, as T rus t ee for P h i l i p 
Combe, t h e l i a b i l i t y may be l i m i t e d as provided in t he Utah 
Code A n n o t a t e d 7 5 - 7 - 3 0 6 . If the p a r t i e s cannot a r r i v e a t 
an a g r e e m e n t among t h e m s e l v e s as t o the re fund, they a re 
i n s t r u c t e d to c o n t a c t t h e ca l enda r c l e r k and have t h e mat te r 
s e t for an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . 
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Dated t h i s h day of AptilCj 1986 . 
BY T«£")COURT: 
/ / 
ROtfALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE ' j 
j 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment to 
the following this ^ T — day of April, 1986. 
John P. Ashton 
Erik Strindberg 
Attorneys at Law 
Third Floor Mony Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James Z. Davis 
Attorney at Law 
1020 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 84 401 
David C. West 
Attorney at Law 
130 0 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bruce Maak 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 1300, 185 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffry R. Burton 
Attorney at Law 
2606 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
97J7. 
- c.V 
Jack L. Schoenhals
 t,,-. j,V. "• V•' 
Attorney for Breuer-Har^io-ri'' 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone No. 363-8823 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND' FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 
J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON, 
Plaintiffs, 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, and 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
TRUSTEE, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AMENDING FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
A 
Civil No. 090135 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee 
for Philip Combe, 
Plaintiffs, 
CASPER J. BREUER AND 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
C i v i l No. 90793 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d mat te r came on r e g u l a r l y for hea r ing 
b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the Judges of
 v 
in C i t y , ^£* t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d C o u r t , i n h i s c o u r t r o o m , Ogdei 
EXHIBIT F 
532 
« i ° s 973 
Weber C o u n t y M u n i c i p a l B u i l d i n g , on J u l y 10, 1986, a t t he 
h o u r of 9:00 a .m. , on Objec t ions t o the F indings of Fact and 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law f i l e d by Kei th P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, 
R o b e r t E. F r o e r e r , A t t o r n e y s T i t l e Guaranty Funding and 
F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank, N.A. ; B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , Casper J . 
B r e u e r and W i l l i a m M. Har r i son were r e p r e s e n t e d by Jack L. 
S c h o e n h a l s , Kei th P. Combe and Evelen Combe were r e p r e s e n t e d 
by J o h n P. A s h t o n , R o b e r t E. F r o e r e r was r e p r e s e n t e d by 
T h e o d o r e E. K a n e l l , T i t l e Guaranty Funding was r e p r e s e n t e d 
by Dav id W e s t , F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank was n e i t h e r p r e s e n t nor 
r e p r e s e n t e d , t h e Court having reviewed the f i l e s and r e c o r d s 
i n t h i s case and having heard argument of c o u n s e l , now makes 
and e n t e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows.: 
1 . The f o l l o w i n g numbered pa ragraphs of t h e F ind ings 
of F a c t d a t e d May 6 , 1 9 8 6 , a r e hereby amended to read as 
f o l l o w s : 
3 . The S e l l e r s p a i d f o r a p o l i c y of t i t l e 
i n s u r a n c e , w h i c h was i s s u e d t o t h e B u y e r s as 
i n s u r e d s . 
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4. The Buyers and Se l le r s entered into four 
amendments t o t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t which 
a l t e r e d t h e t e rms and condit ions of the payments 
due under t h e t e rms of the rea l e s t a t e con t rac t . 
The d a t e s the four amendments were executed are as 
follows: 1 1 / 2 4 / 8 2 ; 1 / 3 / 8 3 ; and two amendments 
were executed on 2/26/84. 
9. P r i o r to the year 1983, the exis tence of 
t h e easement and the aquaduct were not disclosed 
by t h e S-e l l e r s to t h e Buyers, were not noted in 
t h e r e a l e s t a t e con t rac t , or shown as an exception 
on t h e p o l i c y of t i t l e i n s u r a n c e issued to the 
Buyers. 
12 . P a r a g r a p h 12 of the Findings of Fact i s 
he r eby determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is 
h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e Cour t as a Conclusion of 
Law. 
16 . P a r a g r a p h 16 of the Findings of Fact i s 
he r eby determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is 
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h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e C o u r t as a Conclusion of 
Law. 
1 8 . P a r a g r a p h 18 of the F ind ings of Fact i s 
h e r e b y determined t o be a Conclusion of Law and i s 
h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e C o u r t as a Conclus ion of 
Law. 
1 9 . P a r a g r a p h 19 of the F ind ings of Fact i s 
h e r e b y determined t o be a Conclusion of Law and i s 
h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e C o u r t a s a Conclusion of 
Law. 
2 1 . The B u y e r s made a s u b s t a n t i a l e f for t - , 
o v e r a s u b s t a n t i a l pe r iod of t i m e , t o see i f they 
c o u l d m i t i g a t e t h e i r damages and /o r m i t i g a t e t he 
i m p a c t of t h e e a s e m e n t and the aquaduct upon the 
p r o p e r t y , and i n t h i s r e g a r d , t h e y h i r e d t h e 
s e r v i c e s of v a r i o u s e n g i n e e r s and examined s e v e r a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e m e t h o d s of d e v e l o p i n g the p r o p e r t y 
a r o u n d t h e easement and the aquaduct p r i o r t o the 
t i m e t h a t t h e y f i l e d l e g a l a c t i o n and w e r e 
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j u s t i f i e d i n d e l a y i n g the f i l i n g of l e g a l a c t i o n 
u n t i l they made t h a t e f f o r t , 
2 7 . The q u e s t i o n of the re fund, if any, t o 
b e p a i d by t h e S e l l e r s t o t h e B u y e r s , i s a 
q u e s t i o n of f a c t . If the p a r t i e s cannot a r r i v e a t 
an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n themselves as to the amount 
t o be r e f u n d e d , the ques t ion of the amount of the 
r e f u n d , i f a n y , w i l l have t o be r e se rved for a 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n a t a f u t u r e d a t e a f t e r an 
e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . 
2 . T h e f o l l o w i n g n u m b e r e d p a r a g r a p h s of t h e 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law dated May 6, 1986, a r e hereby amended to 
read as fo l l ows : 
1 1 . P a r a g r a p h 11 of the Conclus ions of Law 
i s h e r e b y d e t e r m i n e d to be a Finding of Fact and 
i s h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e C o u r t as a Finding of 
F a c t . 
3- E x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d h e r e i n by t h i s Order, which 
m o d i f i e s and amends the F ind ings of Fact and Conclusions of 
L a w , a l l o t h e r O b j e c t i o n s made by t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e 
- 5 -
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i 
F i n d i n g s of F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, e x c e p t as g r a n t e d 
h e r e i n , a r e h e r e b y o v e r r u l e d and d e n i e d . 
Dated t h i s 2> 0 day of J u l y , 1 9 8 6 . 
0. HYDE, JUDGE f^ 
BY THE ""COURT 
RONALD 
MAILING CERTIFICATE ^ 
I c e r t i f y t h a t ' I m a i l e d a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g O r d e r , 
J o h n P . A s h t o n , E r i k S t r i n d b e r g , A t t o r n e y s a t Law, T h i r d 
F l o o r MONY P l a z a , 424 E a s t F i f t h S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
8 4 1 1 1 ; J a m e s Z. D a v i s , A t t o r n e y a t Law, 1020 F i r s t S e c u r i t y 
B a n k B l d g . , O g d e n , U t a h 8 4 4 0 1 ; David C. W e s t , A t t o r n e y a t 
L a w , 1300 Walker B u i l d i n g , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1 ; Bruce 
M a a k , A t t o r n e y a t Law, S u i t e 1 3 0 0 , 185 S. S t a t e , S a l t Lake 
C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 ; and Theodore E. K a n e l l , A t t o r n e y a t Law, 
650 C l a r k L e a r n i n g B l d g . , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 0 1 , t h i s 
_ \V^~day of J u l y , 1 9 8 6 . , ^ 
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Jack. L. Schoenhals (#2881) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2344 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
TRUSTEE, 
SECOND REVISED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 090135 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for 
CLAIR C. COMBE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
CASPER J. BREUER AND WILLIAM 
M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 90793 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
commencing on September 22, 1987, at 9:30 a.m., before the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge, on the limited 
EXHIBIT G-
i 
issues of the total amount of payments made by Plaintiffs to 
the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and First 
Security Bank, N".A. , Ogden Utah, as Trustee for Clair C. 
Combe, and the amount of restitution and/or refund to be paid 
by the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and Clair C. 
Combe (substituted party for First Security Bank), to the 
Plaintiffs, the Court having determined that the issues 
regarding the claims of the Plaintiffs against Robert E. 
Froerer and the Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund were to have 
been severed and tried at a subsequent date, and the said 
parties not being present, but their counsel being present to 
observe the proceedings, but not being permitted to 
participate in the proceedings, the Plaintiff William 
Harrison being present and having been sworn and having 
given testimony, and being represented by Jack L. Schoenhals, 
the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe having been 
present and having been sworn and having given testimony, and 
being represented by John Ashton and Erik Strindberg; the 
interests of Clair C. Combe being represented by counsel for 
Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe; the parties having called 
additional witnesses who were sworn and having introduced 
testimony and evidence, and the Court having received the 
same, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Keith P. Combe 
2 
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and Evelyn Combe having rested their case, and the matter 
having been fully argued and presented before the Court, and 
the Court having granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for a 
Directed Verdict and for a Judgment, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiffs, Casper J. Breuer and William M. 
Harrison as buyers; and Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and 
First Security Bank, N.A., Trustee, as sellers, entered into 
a Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979. 
2. Pursuant to the terms of the Real Estate Contract, 
the buyers (Plaintiffs) paid the sum of $75,000.00 as a down 
payment. 
3. The buyers and the sellers entered into four 
amendments to the real estate contract which altered the 
terms and conditions of the payments due under the terms of 
the real estate contract, but in all other respects, the Real 
Estate Contract remained in full force and effect. 
4. The Real Estate Contract required the sellers to 
execute and deliver to the buyers or assigns, good and 
sufficient warranty deeds covering title to the property. 
5. The sellers were unable to convey by good and 
sufficient warranty deeds unencumbered title to the real 
3 
property described in the Real Estate Contract. In this 
regard there is a 30 foot wide easement which traverses the 
property diagonally in a northwest direction and within that 
easement is an irrigation aqueduct of substantial size. 
6. The easement and aqueduct are neither described in 
the Real Estate Contract nor are they excepted from the 
obligations of the sellers to convey good and sufficient 
warranty deeds free and clear of liens and encumbrances. 
7. The Court previously determined that the sellers 
could not convey by good and sufficient warranty deeds 
unencumbered title to the real property described in the Real 
Estate Contract and could not comply with paragraph S of the 
Real Estate Contract and could not convey title to the real 
property free and clear of the easement and aqueduct. 
8. The Court previously determined that the easement 
and aqueduct were not a minor inconvenience, but instead 
constituted a substantial encumbrance to the fee title to the 
property. 
9. The Court previously determined that the buyers were 
relieved of any further obligation to perform under the terms 
of the Real Estate Contract. 
10. The Plaintiffs made the payments required under the 
terms of the Real Estate Contract for the years 1980, 1981, 
4 
1982, and 1983. 
11. In the year 1983, the Defendant Keith P. Combe 
desired to borrow money against the balance due on the Real 
Estate Contract, and came to the Plaintiffs for permission to 
borrow against the equity of the Combes, and in the process, 
provided a Title Report to the Plaintiffs which showed that 
there was an easement which ran diagonally across the 
property. The Plaintiffs made inquiry and investigation into 
the status of the property and confirmed the existence of the 
easement. 
12. The Plaintiffs asked their engineering firms to 
investigate the impact of the easement and to determine 
whether or not the easement would prohibit or substantially 
interfere with the development of the property. 
13. For the next several months thereafter, the 
Plaintiffs investigated various alternative ways to overcome 
the effect of the easement and to see if it was possible for 
them to retain the property and develop the property 
profitably, notwithstanding the existence of the easement. 
14. The Plaintiffs made a substantial effort, over a 
substantial period of time, to see if they could mitigate 
their damages and/or mitigate the impact of the easement and 
the aqueduct upon the property, and in this regard, they 
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hired the services of engineers and examined alternative 
methods of developing the property around the easement and 
aqueduct, but concluded that it was not possible to develop 
the property profitably given the purchase price, the cost of 
engineering and expenses necessary to overcome the easement 
and the aqueduct and the loss of market value of the lots as 
a result of the existence of the easement and the burdens 
associated with the easement. 
15. The easement was subject to several burdens and 
requirements which included the following: 
a. The necessity of placing some form of 
concrete bridging or strain relief over the 
aqueduct before a road could be constructed over 
the aqueduct, the cost of which made the placement 
of a road over the aqueduct too expensive to 
reasonably consider for development purposes. 
b. The right of access remaining in the 
conservancy district to repair or replace the line. 
c. The obligation of the cost of the 
restoration of the surface, after replacement or 
repair, being placed upon the owner of fee title to 
the land. 
16. The Plaintiffs met with the Combes for the purpose 
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of attempting to resolve their differences to see if the 
Combes would reduce the purchase price so that they could 
make the development of the property a profitable venture, 
but the Defendant Keith P. Combe advised the Plaintiffs that 
he would not be willing to reduce the purchase price. 
17. On October 1, 1984, the Plaintiffs filed this 
action seeking alternative remedies against the Combes and 
other parties. 
18. The Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment in which they requested a rescission of the 
Real Estate Contract. 
19. The Court awarded the Plaintiffs a Summary Judgment 
and determined that the Defendants were unable to convey 
title as promised in the Real Estate Contract and the Court 
determined that Plaintiffs were entitled to terminate the 
Contract, have an Order of Rescission entered, and were 
entitled to a refund. 
20. The Court directed the parties to attempt to 
resolve, between themselves, the amount of the refund to be 
paid, and if they could not resolve the matter to come back 
to the Court for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of the 
refund to be paid to the Plaintiffs. 
21. The parties could not resolve the matter between 
7 
themselves and the case was set for trial. 
22. The Plaintiffs were unable to locate one or more 
cancelled checks demonstrating payments of principal and 
interest to the Combes and First Security Bank, as trustee 
for Clair C. Combe, and although the Plaintiffs claimed that 
they had made total contract payments in the sum of 
$217,575.25, the Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a 
Stipulation that the Defendants would stipulate and agree and 
the Plaintiffs were willing to stipulate and agree that they 
had paid the total sum of $216,069.69 in payments of 
principal and interest and the additional sum of $15,133.00 
for real estate taxes for a total agreed upon payment by the 
Plaintiffs to the Defendants of principal, interest and taxes 
in the sum of $231,202.00. 
23. The accrued interest on the payments from the date 
the payments were made to and including December 1, 1937, is 
in the sum of $132,595.72, and the accrued interest on the 
payments made on the taxes is in the sum of $596.92 for a 
total of $133,192.64 prejudgment interest at the rate of 6% 
per annum from the date of the payments to and including May 
14, 1981 and at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of 
the payments to and including December 1, 19 87, and the 
additional interest to March 1, 1988 is in the sum of 
8 
$5,764.21, for a total judgment, together with interest in 
the sum of $370,158.85. 
24. Fair rental value or fair market rental means the 
amount for which the property in question could be leased in 
the market with a willing lessor and a willing lessee dealing 
at arms1 length, neither being compelled to lease the 
property, and is the equivalent of the amount for which a 
willing lessor and a willing lessee would be willing to lease 
the property in its present condition. 
25. The fair market rental of the properry is dependent 
upon the market place and a rental figure which is in excess 
of that which a willing lessee would be willing to pay for 
the lease of the property is excessive and does not represent 
the true fair market rental value. 
26. The property which is the subject matter of this 
action has been utilized for many years for the purpose of 
growing alfalfa. 
27. There is a market in the Weber County area for 
rental of unimproved property for alfalfa fields, and other 
agricultural purposes. 
28. The highest and best use for the property which is 
the subject of this action, in its present state, is for 
agricultural purposes for either alfalfa, melons, Christmas 
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trees, or other such similar agricultural use and the sum of 
$75.00 per acre times 20 acres or a total sum of $1,500.00 
per year is the reasonable fair market rental value of the 
property which should be credited to the Combes as a 
deduction from the refund to be paid by the Combes to the 
Plaintiffs. 
29. The ultimate highest and best use for the real 
property is for residential development, but in order to 
achieve the highest and best use, substantial time, money and 
effort must be expended to achieve the highest and best use. 
30. The highest and best use of the property 
(residential development) requires that it be platted, the 
appropriate governmental agency approve the plat and the 
property be developed with the addition of water, sewer and 
utilities, curb, gutter and roadway. 
31. For the years 1980, 1981, 1982 and in to 1982, 
there was a substantial dispute among the various 
governmental entities as to which entity would provide sewer 
services to the property in question. 
32. Shortly after the Plaintiffs entered into the Real 
Estate Contract to purchase the land they proceeded forward 
to attempt to get the property platted, the plat approved and 
sewer and water available for development of the property. 
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33. As a result of the dispute between various 
governmental entities as to .the sewer connection, the 
Plaintiffs did not develop the property for a period of time. 
34. Whether or not the property could be developed 
economically without attachment to a community sewer system 
and whether or not the moratorium issued by the governmental 
authorities prohibited development of the property were 
questions which substantially impacted upon the economic 
feasibility of developing the property during the first few 
years after Plaintiffs had entered into the Real Estate 
Contract with Defendants and delayed the development of the 
property. 
35. The Plaintiffs proceeded forward to attempt to 
develop the property through the years 1980, 1981, and 1982, 
and in the process of attempting to develop the property, had 
hired the services of Great Basin Engineering to perform 
percolation tests, to prepare a plat for the property, and to 
assist the Plaintiffs in obtaining subdivision approval from 
the government authorities. In addition, the Plaintiffs had 
worked with the governmental authorities in an attempt to 
resolve the dispute between the governmental entities as to 
which entity would provide the sewer services to the 
property. 
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36. The property has subsequently been annexed as a 
result of the efforts of the Plaintiffs, and sewer connection 
is now available and because of the present condition of the 
property and the zoning and the community services available, 
the property can now be developed for residential use. 
37. When the Plaintiffs discovered that the easement 
ran diagonally across the property, consisted of a 30' 
easement and had other attendant difficulties attached to the 
easement, they expended a substantial quantity of time and 
money in an effort to see if they could overcome the effect 
of the easement and to develop the property economically. 
38. During the summer of 1984, the Plaintiffs concluded 
that they would be unable to develop the property in a 
profitable manner, given the extent and nature of the 
easement and the cost to overcome the difficulties posed by 
the easement and those which might be posed by the easement 
in the event the restrictions and conditions regarding the 
easement were enforced rigidly, and the Plaintiffs went to 
the Combes to ask the Combes to make a concession in the 
purchase price so that they could proceed forward to develop 
the property in a profitable manner. 
39. Keith Combe refused to grant a price concession and 
the Plaintiffs filed legal action. 
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40. The Defendants1 expert witness and appraiser, 
William Christensen, did not give testimony as to the fair 
market rental value of the property, but instead, gave 
testimony of the fair rate of return that might be expected 
from the profitable development of real estate based upon an 
assumption of an expected annual rate of return on the 
investment at the rate of approximately 10% per year or an 
annual expected rate of return in the amount of $49,350.00 
per year; and then testified that the expected annual rate of 
return on the investment at a fixed percentage of return 
would be equated to fair market rental. The appraiser 
testified, however, that the definition of fair market value 
was the most probable sale price that would occur when two 
people were to negotiate at arms' length with neither being 
compelled to sell or to purchase, and that if there were no 
buyer at the asking price, that the law of supply and demand 
would cause the price to be dropped until it reached the 
level of demand. 
41. Since no potential lessee could be reasonably 
expected to pay $49,350.00 a year for the rental of the 
property, the expected rate of return did not equate to the 
fair market rental of the property and could not be utilized 
for the purpose of determining the fair market rental of the 
13 
property. 
42. The Defendants offered no other testimony 
concerning the fair market rental of the property other than 
the testimony of William Christensen as to the fair rate of 
return that a person might expect on an investment, and which 
rate of return was not the equivalent of the fair market 
rental of the property, 
43. The issue of the amount of the payments made by the 
Plaintiffs to the Defendants was resolved by stipulation 
between the parties• 
44. The only remaining issue to be determined was the 
fair market rental value of the property. 
45. The matter before the court was and is an issue of 
equitable restitution and the Defendants are not entitled to 
a jury trial on the equitable issues. 
46. The matter was not one which should have been 
submitted to a jury for the following reasons: 
a. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants had 
stipulated as to the amounts which had been paid by 
the Plaintiffs to the Defendants for principal and 
interest and had stipulated as to the amounts which 
the Plaintiffs had paid for taxes and there was no 
issue to be resolved concerning the payments made 
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by the Plaintiffs. 
b. The amount of interest to be credited to 
the Plaintiffs was not contested by the Defendants. 
c. There was only one remaining issue to be 
resolved, and that was the fair market rental value 
of the property, 
d. There was no evidence or testimony offered 
by the Defendants of the fair market rental value 
of the property. 
e. The only evidence of the fair market 
rental value of the property was offered by the 
Plaintiffs and that value did not exceed the sum of 
$1,500.00 per year. 
f. The case involved issues of equity and the 
jury opinion would have been advisory only. 
g. There was nothing left to submit to the 
jury since there was no evidence of fair market 
rental other than that submitted by the Plaintiffs. 
47. The Court determined that the matter should not be 
submitted to the jury for an advisory opinion and the Court 
determined that it should rule on the facts and the law and 
should grant the Plaintiffs* Motion for a Directed Verdict 
and/or for a Judgment. 
15 
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48. The Plaintiffs were entitled to a directed verdict 
and/or a judgment to be entered in their behalf in the amount 
Plaintiffs had paid to Defendants and had paid for taxes on 
the real property, and for the interest which had accrued 
thereon from the date of the payments, and the Defendants 
were entitled to a credit for the fair market rental value of 
the property, together with interest thereon, which the Court 
determined did not exceed the sum of $1,500.00 a year. 
49. The Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe 
received 74.6% of the payments and the benefit thereon, and 
the Defendant First Security Bank as trustee for Clair C. 
Combe received 25.4% of the payments and the benefit thereon. 
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, 
now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This is a case in equity and the only issues being 
tried are those of equitable restitution upon a judgment of 
rescission. 
2. The Defendants are not entitled to a jury. The 
Court accommodated the Defendants1 request for a jury with 
the anticipation that the jury would render an advisory 
opinion. 
3. The combination of: the issue of the amount of the 
payments made by Plaintiffs to Defendants having been 
resolved by stipulation between the parties; and the amount 
of the interest due on the payments being uncontested by the 
Defendants; and the failure of the Defendants to provide 
competent evidence to demonstrate that the fair market rental 
of the property exceeded the sum of $1,500-00 per year; 
constituted sufficient cause and justification for the Court 
to determine and conclude that there was nothing left to 
submit to the jury and that it would be improper to submit 
the matter to the jury, 
4. The Court was justified in dismissing the jury and 
in granting a directed verdict, and/or Judgment for the 
Plaintiffs for the sums of money paid by the Plaintiffs and 
as stipulated by the parties and in awarding to the 
defendants a credit in an amount equal to the maximum amount 
demonstrated to be the fair rental value of the property. 
5. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment 
determining that they paid to the Defendants the total sum of 
$216,069.69 in payments on principal and interest and the 
additional sum of $15,133.00 for real estate taxes for a 
total agreed upon payment by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants 
for principal, interest and taxes in the sum of $231,202.00. 
6. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment awarding 
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them prejudgment interest from the date of the payment of the 
principal, interest and taxes in the sum of $13 3,19 2.64, 
together with the additional sum of $5,764.21 representing 
the interest to March 1, 1988. 
7. The Defendants are entitled to a credit against the 
judgment for the reasonable rental of the property for the 
years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 in the sum of 
$1,500.00 per year for a total sum of $7,500.00 credit with 
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum, to and 
including the 22nd day of September, 1987, in the sum of 
$3,562.50 and from September 22, 1987 to March 1, 1988 in the 
sum of $330.82, for a total credit of $11,392.82. 
8. The Defendants introduced no credible or competent 
evidence or testimony to demonstrate that the fair market 
rental of the property would have exceeded the sum of 
$1,500.00 per year. 
9. The Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest 
at the legal rate of 10% per annum from the date each payment 
was made by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants. 
10. In an equitable case of rescission, the Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a refund of the payments they have made, 
including both principal and interest, and payments of real 
property taxes and the Defendants are entitled to a credit 
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for the fair market rental value of the property during the 
time that the Plaintiffs had possession or control over the 
property. 
11. The expected rate of return on an investment is not 
equivalent to the fair market rental value of property in 
question. 
12. The highest and best use of the property in 
question in its present condition was for agricultural 
purposes. 
13. The ultimate highest and best use of the property 
was for residential development purposes, but Defendants were 
not entitled to a credit for the fair market rental value of 
the property in its final development stage since that 
contemplated the expenditure of substantial sums of money to 
develop the property, the obtaining of governmental approval 
and the uncertainties of the profitability of such a venture. 
14. The issue of either the Plaintiffs' knowledge of 
the easement or the Defendants1 knowledge of the easement, is 
not relevant in an action for equitable restitution where the 
Court has rescinded the Contract for the reason that the 
sellers are unable to convey the title the sellers contracted 
to convey in the Real Estate Contract. 
15. The Plaintiffs are entitled to have judgment 
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entered in their behalf and against the Defendants Combes for 
the sums found, less the credit for the fair market rental 
value of the property, together with interest and costs. 
16. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a vendee's lien upon 
the property until the judgment awarded the Plaintiffs has 
been paid in full. 
Dated this / h day of March, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
RONALD 0. HYDE, JU0GE J 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following, 
this 2 day of March, 1988. 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
John Ashton, Esq. 
City Center One, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bruce A. Maak, Esq. 
185 South State, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bernard L. Allen, Esq. 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Theodore E. Kannell, Esq. 
650 Clark Learning Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David E. West, Esq. 
1300 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City,' Utah 84111 
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Jack L. Schoenhals (#2881) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2344 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WE3ER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
TRUSTEE, 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for 
CLAIR C. COMBE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASPER J. BREUER AND WILLIAM 
M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
SECOND REVISED JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 090135 
Civil No. 90793 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
commencing on September 22, 1987, at 9:30 a.m., before the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge, on the limited 
EXHIBIT H 
\ , « . . * $ & 
Indexed 
issues of the total amount of payments made by Plaintiffs to 
the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and First 
Security Bank, N,A., Ogden Utah, as Trustee for Clair C. 
Combe, and the amount of restitution and/or refund to be paid 
by the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and Clair C. 
Combe (substituted party for First Security Bank), to the 
Plaintiffs, the Court having determined that the issues 
regarding the claims of the Plaintiffs against Robert E. 
Froerer and the Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund were to have 
been severed and tried at a subsequent date, and the said 
parties not being present, but their counsel being present to 
observe the proceedings, but not being permitted to 
participate in the proceedings, the Plaintiff William 
Harrison being present and having been sworn and having 
given testimony, and being represented by Jack L. Schoenhals, 
the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe having been 
present and having been sworn and having given testimony, and 
being represented by John Ashton- and Erik Strindberg; the 
interests of Claim C. Combe being represented by counsel for 
Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe; the parties having called 
additional witnesses who were sworn and having introduced 
testimony and evidence, and the Court having received the 
same, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Keith P. Combe 
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and Evelyn Combe having rested their case, and the matter 
having been fully argued and presented before the Court, and 
the Court having granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for a 
Directed Verdict and for a Judgment, the Court having made 
and entered its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, now 
therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a 
judgment against the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn 
Combe, calculated as follows: the sum of $231,202-00, 
together with pre-judgment interest in the sum of $133,192.64 
and $5,764.21, for a total sum of $370,158.85 x 74.6%, for a 
total judgment against Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe, 
jointly and severally, in the sum of $276,138.50, and the 
Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a judgment 
against the Defendant Clair C. Combe, calculated as follows: 
the sum of $231,202.00, together with pre-judgment interest 
in the sum of $133,192.64 and $5,764.21, for a total sum of 
$370,158.85 x 25.4%, for a total judgment against Clair C. 
Combe in the sum of $94,020.35, together with interest 
thereon against the said Defendants at the rate of 12% per 
annum from the date hereof until paid. 
2. The Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and 
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Clair C. Combe, be, and the same are hereby awarded a credit 
against the aforesaid Judgment in the sum of $11,392*82, 
which credit represents the fair market rental value of the 
property during the years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984. 
3. The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a 
vendee's lien on the property which is the subject matter of 
this action and which is described as follows, which lien 
shall remain upon and against the following described 
property until the aforesaid judgment, together with interest 
and costs is paid in full. The real property is described as 
follows: 
PARCEL 1; 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 23 8 feet, 
thence North 900 feet, more or less, to the center 
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said 
centerline to a point North of beginning, thence 
South 930 feet, more or less, to the place of 
beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 2: 
Beginning at a point 7 63 feet East of the Southwest 
corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Running 
thence East 174.3 6 feet; thence North 625 feet, 
more or less, to the centerline of' Combe Road,; 
thence Northwesterly along said centerline to a 
point North of beginning; thence South 750 feet, 
more or less, to the point of beginning. 
Containing 2.75 acres. 
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PARCEL 3 : 
Beginning at a point 937.36 feet East of the 
Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; 
running thence East 60.73 feet; thence 
Northeasterly to a point on the center of Combe 
Road, said point being East 197.88 feet and North 
0°04"30" West 571,02 feet to the centerline of 
Combe Road and Northwesterly along said centerline 
15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centerline of 
said road to a point North of beginning; thence 
South 625 feet to the place of beginning. 
PARCEL 4: 
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest 
corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running 
thence East 2 50 feet, thence North 83 5 feet, more 
or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence 
Northwesterly along said centerline to a point 
North of beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or 
less, to the place of beginning. Containing 5 
acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5: 
Beginning 488 feet East of the Southwest corner of 
the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 275 
feet, thence North 750 feet, more or less, to the 
center of the County Road, thence Northwesterly 
along the center of said County Road to a point 
North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of 
beginning, thence South 83 5 feet, more or less, to 
the point of beginning. Containing 3.4 0 acres. 
4. The Plaintiffs be and the same -are hereby awarded 
their costs of Court. 
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